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ABSTRACT 
In Conflicting Interpretations of Nietzsche's Will to 
Power the problem of discovering the nature of the will to 
power is investigated. Chapter one investigates the 
conflicting statements that Nietzsche makes about the will to 
power. Because there are so many contradictory statements 
interpretations of his writings become useful. The two 
interpretations that are considered in this paper are Walter 
Kaufmann's and Martin Heidegger's. Kaufmann's interpretation 
can be classified as scientific or psychological. Kaufmann 
believes that the will to power is useful only as a tool for 
explaining human behavior. He also believes that Nietzsche 
arrived at his conception of the will to power through 
empirical observation. Heidegger's interpretation can be 
classified as metaphysical. He views the will to power as the 
center of Nietzsche's entire philosophy. Heidegger believes 
that Nietzsche intended for the will to power to be an 
explanation of the physical world. In order to evaluate these 
conflicting interpretations there is a chapter in this paper 
which investigates Nietzsche's view of art. It is obvious 
that the will to power and art are closely related in 
Nietzsche's philosophy so any interpretation of the will to 
power should conform to his artistic views. Heidegger's view 
conforms better than Kaufmann's. This paper concludes that 
Kaufmann seems to understand the early Nietzsche while 
Heidegger grasps the later, metaphysical Nietzsche. 
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At the beginning of any serious discussion about 
Nietzsche a brief mention of his place in history is 
essential. Nietzsche himself considered the time in which he 
was writing an important one and he frankly admitted that it 
had considerable impact on the formulation of his ideas. He 
was born in 1844 and raised primarily by his mother and 
sister. At the age of twenty he studied philology and 
theology at the University of Bonn. After only a year he quit 
theology and began studies at Leipzig. At the young age of 
twenty-five he was given the chair of classical letters at 
the University of Basel, and his doctorate, without the 
customary examination. Three years later, in 1972, he 
published his first book entitled Birth of Tragedy (Solomon 
vii). In the following sixteen years Nietzsche would write 
close to fifteen books as well as innumerable notes and 
articles. The goal in this introductory paragraph is not to 
give a detailed biography of Nietzsche's life, the goal is to 
mention the time period in which Nietzsche was actively 
thinking and writing. He reacts against the metaphysics of 
such influential German thinkers as Kant(1724-1804), 
Hegel(1770-1831) and Schopenhauer(1788-1860) while providing 
inspiration for much of twentieth century Continental 
philosophy. His own writings attest to the rejection of his 
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German predecessors metaphysics while many interpreters have 
traced contemporary ideas back to Nietzsche's influence. 
Dante points out that there are striking resemblances between 
Nietzsche's view of truth and that of the early pragmatists. 
Also, there are resemblances to Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellers, 
Goodman, and Putnam. Furthermore, West believes that 
Nietzsche's ideas on epistemology and metaphysics have had 
such an enormous influence on the contemporary intellectual 
scene in both Europe and the United States that he calls him 
"the central figure of post modern thought in the west" (Clark 
3). Even Freud, whose influence on twentieth century thought 
cannot be denied , said of Nietzsche "that he had a more 
penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever 
lived or was ever likely to live" (qtd. in "Nietzsche", 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 505). So, Nietzsche's philosophy 
involves reaction to early 19th century German philosophy (and 
a reaction to almost all philosophy since the ancient Greeks), 
and it has a definite influence reaching up to the present. 
Now that it is clear where Nietzsche stands in the time-
line of philosophy, a brief mention of his style of writing 
is appropriate. Nietzsche says, of his own style, that he is 
practicing 'psychological observation' and that he is 
contributing to the 'history' or the 'genealogy' of morals 
(Wilcox 2). These proclamations imply a certain objectivity 
that places Nietzsche in the role of an investigator. In much 
of his work he does in fact "Philosophize with a hammer"(TI 
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463), breaking down established ideas or "idols" in order to 
see what is left. But, this neutrality does not hold up in 
all of his writings, he also takes sides. Nietzsche does more 
than objectively evaluate particular ideas, he openly attacks 
the herd, slave morality, metaphysics, socialism and 
Christianity (to name only a few). He also builds up his own 
value systems such as the will to power. This dual aspect of 
Nietzsche's writings will become an important consideration 
of this paper. While criticizing metaphysical theory in one 
statement he will, in another statement, espouse his own ideas 
(will to power and eternal recurrence) which appear to be 
essentially metaphysical. Also, several of his assertions are 
ambiguous, the same sentence can be used to support both a 
pro-metaphysical and an anti-metaphysical interpretation. For 
this reason, the interpretations of Nietzsche's writings 
become almost as important as the writings themselves. 
It is mentioned above that there is a certain ambiguity 
as to where Nietzsche stands on metaphysical thought. This 
uncertainty is magnified when the concept of the will to power 
is examined. The will to power can be viewed as a 
metaphysical theory. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines 
metaphysical thought as "a-priori speculation on questions 
that cannot be answered by scientific observation and 
experiment"("Metaphysics" 
metaphysical as simply 
289). Heidegger defines 
"a question of being". 
the 
The 
metaphysical interpretation of the will to power can be 
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classified here as Heidegger's interpretation and it will be 
contrasted, in this paper, with Kaufmann' s interpretation 
which can be called psychological or scientific. Kaufmann is 
openly hostile to Heidegger's interpretation, and in his 
article for the Encyclopedia of Philosophy he states that: 
As a metaphysical theory about the universe or ultimate 
reality, the doctrine [will to power] need not be taken 
seriously .... Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, 
which makes this metaphysic the center of his thought and 
significance, depends on a complete disregard for the 
context of the passages he sites and the Gestalt of 
Nietzsche's thought generally. He assigns to Nietzsche 
a totally uncongenial role in the history of western 
thought, [and] disregards the bulk of his 
writings .. ("Nietzsche" 510) 
It is clear that these two interpreters of Nietzsche stand on 
opposite sides of the same fence. 
The disagreement between Kaufmann and Heidegger about the 
status of the will to power is the major consideration of this 
paper. The best way to discuss this conflict is, first, to 
show as thoroughly as possible why there is a conflict. 
Chapter one of this paper will be devoted to looking at key 
selections from Nietzsche's texts and showing how they paint 
an ambiguous picture of the will to power. Chapters two and 
three will discuss Kaufmann and Heidegger's different 
interpretations of the will to power. Also, the passages that 
are used in chapter one will be examined from the viewpoint 
of each interpretation (other passages will be explored as 
well). Chapter four will go back to discussing Nietzsche 
directly. His theory dealing with art and the artist will be 
examined, and special attention will be given to the 
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unquestionable connection that art has to the will to power. 
In chapter five the controversy between Kaufmann and Heidegger 
will be resumed and the purpose of the paper will be 
fulfilled. Both interpretations will be evaluated according 
to their consistency with Nietzsche's texts. Of special 
interest is the consistency that each interpretation has with 
Nietzsche's ideas about art. 
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****CHAPTER 1**** 
WHY THERE IS A CONFLICT 
Heidegger's metaphysical conception of the will to power 
and Kaufmann' s psychological conception are the only two 
interpretations under consideration in this paper. Before 
looking closely at these it is necessary to find out why there 
is the opportunity for different interpretations of this idea 
of the will to power. 
There are several instances where it appears that 
Nietzsche is giving a direct account of the will to power as 
a metaphysical force, as something that is "the basic force 
of the entire universe"(Kaufmann 207). Many of these direct 
references occur in his later writings and appear as a 
collection of notes entitled The Will to Power (the notes in 
The Will to Power were not organized by Nietzsche himself). 
It is important to note that this chapter is meant to set up 
the conflict in Nietzsche's writings. Detailed analysis of 
the passages that are used will come later in the paper. True 
to the ambiguous nature of most of Nietzsche's work, many of 
the lines that are cited in order to support the metaphysical 
interpretation can be used to support a psychological one as 
well. Nevertheless, the passages that are cited in the first 
part of this chapter are striking in their blunt assertions 
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that the will to power is metaphysical. For example: 
My theory contends that all productive energy is will to 
power and that there is no physical, dynamic or 
psychological force beside it .. (qtd. in Pfeffer 145) 
Here, the mention of there being no other psychological or 
physical force seems to point directly to something that 
extends beyond human behavior. The above lines imply that 
this 'force' is something that underlies so-called physical 
reality as well. In another line this distinction is made 
more clearly. The line comes from note #1067 in The Will to 
Power. 
Do you know what 'the world', is to me? .... This world 
is the will to power-and nothing besides! And you 
yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing 
besides. (WP 550) 
Here 'the world' is said to be the will to power and human 
beings (whom he is apparently addressing) are also this will 
to power. This too appears to be telling the reader that the 
will to power is meant to explain more than just human 
behavior. It seems as if it also comprises the character of 
the external world, or of all 'being' (to put it in 
Heideggerian terms). If this was not Nietzsche's point it 
seems strange that he would distinguish between the will to 
power's relation to 'the world' and its relation to human 
beings. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche reacts to the 
physicists' belief in "nature's conformity to law". He talks 
about someone coming along who has a different way of 
interpretation, someone who knows how to read something 
different out of the same nature and the same phenomena. 
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An interpreter who could bring before your eyes the 
universality and unconditionality of all "will to power" 
in such a way that almost any word and even the word 
"tyranny" would finally seem unsuitable or as a weakening 
and moderating metaphor-as too human- .. (BGE 30) 
Once again there is the comparison between the will to power 
as it relates to the world, in this case nature, and the 
condition of human beings. This excerpt seems to tell us that 
we as human beings do not even have an accurate word for what 
this underlying force of the world is like. Since physics is 
the subject being discussed and the will to power is what an 
'opposite' interpretation of nature discovers, it would be 
logical to assume that the will to power is something that 
refers to physical things as well as human traits. 
Perhaps the most blatant assertion of a metaphysical will 
to power occurs in the next selection which is from Beyond 
Good and Evil. Maudemarie Clark refers to the entire passage 
(passage #36) as the only place in all of Nietzsche's 
published writings where a clear case is made for a 
metaphysical conception of the will to power (Clark 212). The 
last sentence of the passage stands out as the most 
compelling. 
The world seen from within, the world described and 
defined according to its ''intelligible character"- it 
would be "will to power" and nothing else.- (BGE 48) 
Nietzsche mentions 'the world seen from within' which is very 
metaphysical language. It is reminiscent of Kant's thing-
in-itself or of 'lifting the veil of maya•, which Nietzsche 
discusses in Birth of Tragedy in order to describe the 
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ultimate reality that the artist can sometimes have access to. 
This passage demonstrates another instance where the will to 
power looks as if it is being presented as an underlying force 
of nature and the world, as something having impact on far 
more than human behavior. Finally, in a distinctly poetic 
letter to von Gersdorff, Nietzsche writes about the will to 
power in a way that distinguishes it from merely being an 
explanation of psychological processes. 
The storm broke violently in gale and fury; I experienced 
an enormous feeling of stimulation .... How different the 
lightning, the storm and hail: free forces without 
morals. How glad, how strong they are; pure willing 
without the obscuring activity of the intellect. 
(qtd. in Pfeffer 203) 
Not only is the storm directly associated with 'pure willing', 
but human features such as morals and the intellect are set 
apart from this 'willing'. This distinction between the will 
to power and humanness is one which occurs more than once in 
Nietzsche's writings (as is shown in this section) and it is 
a key element to the idea that the will to power is 
metaphysical. The above excerpt, as well as the others that 
have been used, go a long way toward persuading a 'casual 
reader' that Nietzsche intended the will to power to be 
metaphysical. But, what has not been discussed yet are 
Nietzsche's extremely anti-metaphysical views and the 
alternative interpretations to the passages cited so far. 
Several of Nietzsche's texts suggest that he clearly 
rejects metaphysics. Sometimes this 'rejection' is so 
passionate that it might be better classified as an attack. 
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Since Kaufmann's interpretation is one which holds that the 
will to power is not metaphysical but simply a theory 
regarding human motivation these passages are of special 
interest to his point of view. In one of his earliest books, 
Human all too Human, Nietzsche does not waste any time before 
launching into a criticism of metaphysical knowledge. In the 
second paragraph he states that "there are no eternal facts, 
just as there are no absolute truths"(HA 13). Further down 
he states that it is a mark of higher culture to value little 
unpretentious truths rather than the "errors handed down by 
metaphysical and artistic ages of men, which blind us and make 
us happy" (HA 13) . In these brief excerpts Nietzsche's 
rejection of metaphysics can be seen in two ways. First, the 
rejection of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal facts' implies that 
the activity of formulating a metaphysical theory is a waste 
of time. Secondly, his preference for unpretentious truths 
seems to show that he resents the actual theories that have 
come out of metaphysics. He is reacting against both the 
practicing of metaphysics as well as established metaphysical 
theory. 
Aside from criticizing metaphysics in general Nietzsche 
appears to have contempt for metaphysicians. In the passage 
"on self- overcoming" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra he speaks 
about those who want to make all being thinkable 
(metaphysicians). He says that it is a well founded suspicion 
that being is already not thinkable. These metaphysicians 
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cause being to "become smooth and serve the spirit as its 
mirror and reflection" and are guilty of creating a world 
before which they can kneel (Z 225). What this is saying is 
that the metaphysician who seeks out being is in fact only 
creating a fiction that serves his/her own human spirit. This 
does not seem like the kind of behavior that Nietzsche would 
want to associate himself with, nor does it speak highly of 
his reverence for metaphysics. In another passage Nietzsche 
makes his contempt for those who practice metaphysics clear. 
When we hear the hair-splitting metaphysicians and 
prophets of the after-world speak, we others feel indeed 
that we are the 'poor in spirit', but that ours is the 
heavenly kingdom of change, with spring and autumn, 
summer and winter, and theirs the after-world, with 
its grey, everlasting frosts and shadows. 
(qtd. in Wilcox 112) 
Again, this sounds like a personal attack on those who 
practice metaphysics. Also present in this line is his denial 
of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal fact' which are both key 
elements in the presentation of any in metaphysical theory. 
The contrast between the change of this world and the static, 
barren quality of the 'after-world' attest to this denial. 
It was mentioned earlier that in Human All Too Human 
Nietzsche launches several attacks on metaphysical theory and 
practice. Still early on in the text he rails against past 
metaphysical theory again . 
.. All that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions 
valuable, terrible, delightful to [people], all that has 
begotten these assumptions, is passion, error and self-
deception; the worst of all methods of acquiring 
knowledge, not the best of all, have taught belief in 
them. (HA 15) 
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Here it seems clear that Nietzsche has little respect for any 
established metaphysical idea. This criticism in and of 
itself does not necessarily prevent him from forming his own 
metaphysical theory though. Criticizing past metaphysical 
theories is not the same criticizing the possibility for 
metaphysical knowledge. What does make it difficult for 
Nietzsche to posit his own metaphysical theory is his 
rejection of 'absolute truth' and 'eternal fact' . Also, there 
are several places where he directly denies the possibility 
of having knowledge about a metaphysical world. Again, Human 
All Too Human provides evidence of this. 
-For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical 
world except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, 
incomprehensible being other; it would be a thing with 
negative qualities. -Even if the existence of such a 
world were never so well demonstrated, it is certain that 
knowledge of it would be the most useless of all 
knowledge: (HA 15-16) 
With this quote in mind, it seems unlikely that Nietzsche 
would put forth his own theory of the will to power as being 
metaphysical. He openly states that even if there were an 
underlying metaphysical reality, knowledge about it would be 
useless. The amount of emphasis he places on the will to 
power seems to make it incompatible with a 'useless' 
metaphysical theory. 
A possible defence for the metaphysical view, at this 
point, is to mention that these tirades against metaphysics 
occur in Nietzsche's earlier works. One could claim that 
Nietzsche simply reevaluated this position and constructed his 
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own metaphysical theory after all. Mention of the will to 
power as a metaphysical force occurs mostly in his later 
writings anyway. The problem with this defence is that a 
rejection of the metaphysical still exists in works written 
as late as 1888. In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche speaks 
eagerly about the end of the idea of a "true" or metaphysical 
world. 
The "true" world- an idea which is no longer good for 
anything, not even obligating-an idea which has become 
useless and superfluous- consequently, a refuted idea: 
let us abolish it! (TI 485) 
This eagerness to 'abolish' the "true" world seems to be 
equivalent to an eagerness to end metaphysical speculation and 
it would look very unusual standing next to a metaphysical 
conception of the will to power. 
It has been established that Nietzsche expresses strong 
anti-metaphysical views in several of his texts. This appears 
to be damaging to a position that represents the will to power 
as metaphysical. After all, how could a thinker present a 
metaphysical doctrine while being so opposed to metaphysics? 
What is also damaging to the metaphysical view is the dual 
nature of many of the texts that can be used to support it. 
When Nietzsche states that "This world is the will to power 
and nothing besides!"(WP 550) the impact is somewhat lessened 
by the preceding line which states; "Do you know what 'the 
world' is to me?''(WP 550). The fact that 'the world' is in 
quotation marks makes the meaning of 'the world' ambiguous, 
also, Nietzsche seems to admit that this is only how the world 
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appears to him. The first passage that was taken from Beyond 
Good and Evil (passage# 22) runs across similar ambiguities. 
It is only stating that a clever interpreter could demonstrate 
the universality of all will to power. Nietzsche also seems 
to distance himself from the second passage that was used from 
Beyond Good and Evil (# 36). Throughout the passage he slips 
in and out of treating the whole argument as a hypothetical 
one, also, he only claims to define the world according to its 
'intelligible character' and not how it really is. 
It is clear that a metaphysical representation of the 
will to power has some problems to overcome. The view must 
be reconciled with a host of anti-metaphysical statements, and 
the ambiguities that exist in the places where Nietzsche does 
assert that the will to power is metaphysical must be sorted 
through. Heidegger's strategy for overcoming these problems 
is that he admits the contradiction between the anti-
metaphysical statements and the metaphysical concept of the 
will to power. In fact he says that the rejection of 
metaphysics and 'absolute truth' is a necessary outcome of 
his metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche. Also, there are 
still some passages which seem to make unequivocal claims 
about the will to power representing some kind of underlying 
metaphysical reality. 
Kaufmann's interpretation also has some problems to deal 
with. The passages which occur in Nietzsche's later writings 
do imply a concept of the will to power that is more than 
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psychological. While Kaufmann can point to evidence of 
Nietzsche's denial of metaphysics in response to this, this 
strategy is a double edged sword. Along with the denial of 
metaphysics Nietzsche includes a denial of all truth. This 
threatens to prevent Nietzsche from asserting anything of 
value. While Heidegger views this denial of truth as the 
outcome of a metaphysical theory, Kaufmann denies that the 
denial of truth is really a denial of all truth. Kaufmann's 
position on this problem, as well as his overall 
interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power, will become more 
clear in the next chapter. 
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****CHAPTER 2**** 
KAUFMANN1 S INTERPRETATION 
The best strategy for presenting Kaufmann's interpretation 
of Nietzsche's will to power is to show first how Kaufmann 
views the evolution of this concept. He points to one of the 
first places where the idea of power makes an appearance. In 
the notes for The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche speaks about 
power in a negative way, considering it to be equivalent to 
worldly power, social success, making friends, and influencing 
people. In these notes Nietzsche speaks about "Power which 
is always evil" (qtd. in Kaufmann 180) and in the meditation 
on Wagner (also an early writing) he asks; "Who of you will 
renounce power, knowing and experiencing that power is 
evil?"(qtd. in Kaufmann 180). He seems to have used Wagner 
as a case study for this negative aspect of power. Kaufmann 
points to the first time the phrase 'will to power' is 
explicitly used and mentions its relation to Wagner. The 
passage occurs in one of the notes of the late eighteen-
seventies and states that "Fear and will to power explain our 
strong consideration for the opinions of men" (qtd. in 
Kaufmann 179). Kaufmann interprets this quote as reflecting 
Nietzsche's disappointment in how Wagner became corrupted by 
power. He apparently saw Wagner as making his peace with the 
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church and the state because of the desire to maintain and 
increase his 'power'. While the idea of power makes its first 
appearance as a negative force it is clear that Nietzsche saw 
more potential in it. Even though power is used to describe 
negative desires in the meditation on Wagner it also is shown 
to have the potential to be "entirely transformed into 
artistic creativity"(qtd. in Kaufmann 180). 
It is appropriate to look at how the will to power 
develops into a larger theory. In Human All Too Human 
Nietzsche delves into psychological observation. It is clear 
that Kaufmann admires this phase in Nietzsche's writings: 
The irrational springs of human behavior are uncovered 
expertly, and the self-styled vivisectionist cuts 
mercilessly through prejudices and conventions to lay 
bare the hidden motivations of our actions. (Kaufmann 183) 
One example of how this work explains human behavior in the 
context of power is seen in the analysis of gratitude. 
Without the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man 
would have shown himself powerless and would hence be 
considered so.(HA 36) 
Kaufmann interprets this quote as saying that when someone 
helps me there is the implication that I am powerless, I am 
therefore degraded in the other person's eyes as well as my 
own. I then thank the person and reverse the implication, now 
he has done something for me as if he were my servant. 
Gratitude becomes a form of revenge here prompted by this idea 
of the will to power (Kaufmann 184). In this work Nietzsche 
also describes pity as a form of power. The neurotic's desire 
for pity is really a desire to hurt. This way he at least has 
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one power, the power to hurt others. In Human All Too Human 
Nietzsche goes on to explain our tendency to conform, 
Christian self abasement, and our desire for freedom as all 
being manifestations of this early form of the will to power. 
In a short aphorism from the same work he states, "He that 
humbleth himself wills to be exalted" (HA 48) . Kaufmann points 
out that this statement shows that even an apparent negation 
of the will to power, caused by humbling one's self, can be 
explained in terms of desiring more power. Here the concept 
is indeed growing larger but Kaufmann tells us that it is not 
yet a psychological monism. He contends that first the will 
to power is shown as a craving for worldly success as in the 
case of Wagner, then it is used as a psychological hypothesis 
to explain various kinds of behavior. At this stage the 
concept is still a tool for discovering the motivation for 
certain actions, mainly actions that Nietzsche disapproves of 
(Kaufmann 185). 
An exception to this view of power as being wholly 
negative is Nietzsche's mention of the will to power in 
relation to freedom. In a note from the same period as Human 
All Too Human he states: 
The pleasure of power is explained by the hundredfold 
experience of displeasure at dependence and impotence. 
If this experience is not there, then the pleasure is 
lacking, too. (qtd. in Kaufmann 186) 
Kaufmann rightly points out two things in relation to this 
passage. First of all, and most importantly, Nietzsche is 
speaking about power in a positive sense. This is evident 
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because he puts it at odds with dependence and impotence, two 
things that he definitely disapproves of. Power is shown as 
something that overcomes these negative states and is 
therefore something positive. Secondly, power is not shown 
as something that can be enjoyed in and of itself. Power can 
be appreciated only as more power. Power is valuable only if 
it results in deliverance from things that restrict power 
(Kaufmann 186). 
Kaufmann states that in Daybreak Nietzsche is coming 
close to declaring that the will to power is the sole 
motivation for human behavior. Even though he does not refer 
to the concept by name there are numerous instances where he 
reduces a wide variety of human phenomena to the idea of 
power. Kaufmann picks out some of these instances for us. 
The lust for money which gives rise to dishonesty in business, 
counterfeiting and stock market speculation ( among other 
actions) is translated into a lust for power (D 204). The 
history of the Jews is attributed to their desire to achieve 
a feeling of power (D 215). Socialism and the limitations 
that it imposes on people are said to be tolerated because, 
"(the limitations] are self-imposed, and the feeling 
of .... this power is so young and charming to them that they 
would suffer anything for its sake"(D 184). Napoleon and his 
actions are attributed to his desire to have the power to 
determine his own manner of speaking (D 245). Kindness too, 
is interpreted in terms of ones quest to retain or gain more 
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power (D 248) . Eventually, Kaufmann shows that Nietzsche came 
to the realization that all of Greek culture was also 
motivated by the will to power (Kaufmann 191-2). 
Kaufmann points out that towards the end of Daybreak 
Nietzsche states: "They [the Greeks] valued the feeling of 
power more highly then any kind of utility or good name" (Dawn 
360). In other words, they preferred power over and above all 
else. Also, in one of the notes from this same time period 
Nietzsche states that 'the Greeks frankly admitted their will 
to power' (Kaufmann 192). Kaufmann states that: 
This sudden association of the will to power with the 
Greeks was one of the most decisive steps in the 
development of this conception into an all-embracing 
monism. (Kaufmann 192) 
Nietzsche already considered the contest to be the key to 
analyzing Greek culture. The rivalries that existed between 
the dramatists were thought to be a kind of contest. Also, 
the Olympic games and the greek gymnasium acted as forums for 
contests which played a central role in Greek culture. 
Furthermore, the speeches and dialogues of Plato were viewed 
as his effort to outdo the sophists and poets, while the 
Socratic dialectic was seen as a type of spiritual contest 
(Kaufmann 192) . Kaufmann shows that the contest was 
previously thought to be at the root of Greek culture, and 
then he maintains that towards the end of Daybreak it is 
implied that the contest itself is a manifestation of the will 
to power. The will to power thus fills the role previously 
held by the contest and can be " .. envisaged as the basis of 
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Greek culture, which Nietzsche then considered the acme of 
humanity" (Kaufmann 192) . So, if the will to power is the 
basis of Greek culture, which Nietzsche considered to be 
supreme, it seems logical to assume that it is somehow the 
basis of all culture. In any case, it is evident that the 
will to power is no longer confined to the negative impulses 
of the neurotic or the greedy person. Nietzsche is close to 
viewing the will to power as 'an all-embracing monism' here 
but Kaufmann claims that this proclamation does not occur 
until Zarathustra. 
Kaufmann shows that there are statements in the later 
pages of Daybreak that will not allow the will to power to 
exist as a monism. In "The Striving for Excellence."(D 113), 
which occurs fairly early on in the work, Nietzsche sets up 
'a history of culture' that uses the idea of power as a value 
standard. The barbarian exists on the bottom of the scale 
because he wishes to hurt, he is depicted as having a low 
degree of the 'striving for excellence' or a low degree of 
power. Higher degrees of power involve wishing to elevate 
one's neighbor and to impress and delight him. Later on, 
Nietzsche expresses a negative view of the German Reich and 
its power in "The Demon of Power" (D 262). But, this view does 
not criticize the Reich because it expresses a low degree of 
power, like that of the barbarian; it criticizes the power 
itself as evil. 
Not need, nor desire-no, the love of power is the demon 
of man ..... One may take everything away from them and 
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satisfy this demon: then they are almost happy.(D 262) 
This passage can be seen as indicating that Nietzsche is 
backsliding into a view of power that is not all encompassing. 
Kaufmann tells us that he is instead mixing the idea of power 
with reason. Power alone is not yet the universal measure of 
a nation's or person's worth but worth is measured by 'the 
degree of reason in strength' or power tempered with reason 
(Kaufmann 195-7). This stands in opposition to the monistic 
view of power that is discussed in relation to the Greek 
contest. Kaufmann believes that in Zarathustra Nietzsche 
finally disposes of his view of power mixed with reason and 
adopts the will to power as the basic force behind all human 
activity. 
The passage from Zarathustra that Kaufmann believes is 
the most important with regard to the will to power is "On 
the Thousand and One Goals". This passage is essentially 
about different nations and their different moral codes, 
customs and goals. Here, Nietzsche is saying that even though 
there might be severe differences between nations on these 
matters, their different beliefs are all manifestations of the 
will to power. Furthermore, the standard used to evaluate 
these different nations is also the will to power. This seems 
to be clearly illustrated in the section of the passage which 
Kaufmann has chosen. 
A table of virtues hangs over every people. Behold, it 
is the table of its overcoming; behold, it is the voice 
of its will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems 
difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and 
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difficult is called good; and ... the rarest, the most 
difficult-that they call holy. (Z 170) 
Here, Kaufmann sees the will to power as being placed in a 
position where it alone is the standard for evaluation. A 
nation's ability to overcome itself is a direct manifestation 
of its will to power. Also, Kaufmann sees the entire passage 
as stating that being able to overcome itself is what will 
determine that nation's ability to excel above other nations, 
in other words it will determine the value of that nation. 
This concept of self-overcoming (for Kaufmann) is meant to 
represent the situation where a society overcomes or 
transcends its own natural state. In overcoming itself a 
nation posits things like good and evil in order to control 
its natural tendencies towards violence and barbarism. This 
overcoming suppresses a state of anarchy and makes room for 
culture to develop. The passage makes it clear that this 
overcoming is also a difficult process. Kaufmann tells us 
that the comparison between nations that he sees illustrated 
in "On The Thousand And One Goals" is Nietzsche's vision of 
the globe as a 'Greek gymnasium' where nations compete with 
each other, trying to overcome themselves, and hence, each 
other as well (Kaufmann 201). No other force such as reason 
is necessary here; reason is incorporated into the will to 
power. Kaufmann believes this is where Nietzsche made a clear 
decision. 
Instead of assuming two qualitatively different 
principles, such as strength and reason, he would reduce 
both to a single, more fundamental force: the will to 
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power. (Kaufmann 202) 
This 'decision' is emphasized in another passage from 
Zarathustra. entitled "on self overcoming". 
Only where there is life, there is also will: not will 
to life but .... will to power. (Z 227) 
The fine points of this passage will be discussed later on. 
For now it is significant in showing Nietzsche's commitment 
to viewing the will to power as a single basic force. In 
Zarathustra Kaufmann believes that the will to power has 
clearly developed into a psychological monism. At this point 
he thinks it can be called the sole motivation for human 
action. He also thinks that this is as far as this concept 
can go. 
Now that Kaufmann' s ideas on the evolution of this 
concept have been presented it is appropriate to look at how 
he viewed Nietzsche's ideas on the metaphysical status of the 
will to power. It is important to trace thoroughly Kaufmann' s 
portrayal of the evolution of the will to power because his 
ideas on how the concept developed are so closely connected 
to how he views the will to power's overall place in 
Nietzsche's philosophy. To summarize briefly, Kaufmann has 
shown how the will to power went from being an entirely 
negative principle associated with the kind of ambition seen 
in Wagner, to a tool for explaining various types of 
psychological phenomena in Human All Too Human. The idea then 
widened further in Daybreak where eventually the will to power 
was labeled as being the sole motivation for Greek Culture. 
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At this stage though, it seems as if Nietzsche could not 
decide whether the will to power could be labeled as a single 
motivating force (and a standard for evaluating for human 
action) or if reason was also needed to temper and control 
power. In Zarathustra he apparently makes the decision to 
employ the singular concept of will to power as a basic force 
that both motivates and evaluates human behavior. 
This long development of the will to power fits 
Kaufmann's idea that the concept is an empirical one and that 
Nietzsche considered himself an experimenter and not a 
metaphysician. Kaufmann points to the passage in Daybreak 
where Nietzsche says that he plans on doing away with the 
metaphysician' s habit of making grandiose, wide sweeping 
statements that 'unriddle the universe' or 'solve all with 
one word' and instead substitute "small single questions and 
experiments"(D 547) (Kaufmann 204). This image of Nietzsche 
conducting 'small experiments' is key to Kaufmann' s conception 
of the will to power as an empirical theory arrived at through 
induction. He believes that Nietzsche pursued different 
investigations of human beings with no preconceived notions 
of what he would find. The whole idea of a proven, all-
encompassing, monistic will to power (for Kaufmann) is not 
what prompted Nietzsche's 'experiments'. Rather, the will to 
power is what resulted from experimentation. Kaufmann 
describes how he views the formulation of the will to power. 
Empirical studies, moreover, had led him to assume that 
all human behavior could be explained in terms of the 
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will to power. His own psychological observations, 
coupled with historical studies ..... and augmented, 
finally, by a sketchy knowledge of the natural sciences, 
had convinced Nietzsche that "the will to power is the 
most profound fact to which we penetrate"(Kaufmann 229) 
Here Kaufmann's commitment to an empirical view of the will 
to power is clear. Placing this particular quote at the end 
of the passage shows that Kaufmann is trying to demonstrate 
that will to power is something that Nietzsche believes is 
discovered through human experience. In other words, if it 
is the deepest fact that we can have knowledge of, then it is 
through critical observation of life experience that we know 
it. For Kaufmann, the concept of will to power is not reached 
through reflection. 
In other passages, Kaufmann directly states that the will 
to power is not a metaphysical theory but one that was reached 
through 'experimenting'. 
[Nietzsche's] conception of the will to power is not 
metaphysical either in Heidegger's sense or in the 
positivists'; it is first and foremost the key concept 
of a psychological hypothesis. (Kaufmann 204) 
The term 'psychological hypothesis' is meant to stress the 
empirical nature of the will to power. Again, Kaufmann can 
be seen as maintaining that the evolution of the will to power 
plays a role in the final conception of it. The 'stages' that 
the theory undergoes during its evolution are characteristic 
of the working out of a hypothesis. 
Even statements that apparently support a metaphysical 
conception of the will to power are interpreted by Kaufmann 
to be empirical. When Nietzsche makes the bold assertions in 
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"On Self-Overcoming" that all living beings are driven by the 
will to power and "where there is life there is also will" (Z 
227), Kaufmann instead focusses on one sentence towards the 
end of the passage. The sentence is "Thus Life Taught me"(Z 
228) and Kaufmann believes that the sentence is there to 
indicate that the above insights are based on experience or, 
as Kaufmann states, are "offered in an empirical 
spirit" (Kaufmann 206). This reaction to the passage is 
further evidence of Kaufmann' s commitment to the idea that the 
will to power is empirical. There are several statements 
about the will to power (some in chapter one) that on the 
surface look metaphysical but upon further examination (with 
Kaufmann's help) prove to be anti-metaphysical or supportive 
of an empirical view. These will be examined later. Specific 
attention will be given to passage number thirty-six in part 
two of Beyond Good and Evil, which many believe is the only 
published argument for a metaphysical view of the will to 
power. This passage can be seen as lending further support 
to Kaufmann' s claim that the will to power is empirical. 
There are also several other points that can be examined in 
this rich passage. 
Kaufmann cites this passage as being a sign that during 
the period in which Nietzsche wrote Beyond Good and Evil he 
was still committed to the idea of experimentation and basing 
ideas on empirical evidence (Kaufmann 217). It is helpful to 
look at some lines that are related to this point. Early on, 
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Nietzsche asks, "is it not permitted to make the 
experiment ... "(BGE 47) and later he speaks about the 
"conscience of method" (BGE 48) demanding that 'the experiment' 
be permitted. This talk about 'method' and 'experimenting' 
are part of what leads several interpreters to reject the idea 
that the passage is supporting a metaphysical stance. The 
recurring use of these terms does in fact seem to support a 
more empirical outlook. Experimenting with a particular idea 
appears to be what Nietzsche has in mind throughout this 
passage. For example, 
Not to assume several kinds of causality until the 
experiment of making do with a single one has been pushed 
to its utmost limit. (BGE 48) 
This is probably one of the lines that Kaufmann had in mind 
when selecting the whole passage to support the . idea that 
Nietzsche was still bound to empirical investigation and 
experimentation. Obviously, the single causality mentioned 
above is the will to power and it looks as if it is still 
being tested to see how much it really can explain rather than 
being put forth as a metaphysical doctrine. 
Kaufmann believes that the will to power is an empirical 
theory arrived at through experimentation or asking 'small 
single questions' and that it is by no means a metaphysical 
theory. To support this anti-metaphysical view it is helpful 
to point to parts of Nietzsche's writings that discredit 
metaphysics (this was shown in chapter one). What becomes 
problematic here is that along with rejecting metaphysics 
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Nietzsche often rejects the possibility of all truth as well. 
In Human All Too Human, while undermining metaphysics, 
Nietzsche states that "there are no eternal facts, just as 
there are no absolute truths"(HA 13). In The Gay Science he 
says that we do not have any organ for knowledge or 'truth' 
(GS 300). In later writings and unpublished notes he goes on 
to say such things as, "truths are illusions we have forgotten 
are illusions", that "truth is the kind of error without which 
a certain kind of being could not live" and he states that 
there are "no facts" but "only interpretations" (qtd. in Clark 
2). Even Kaufmann points to where Nietzsche criticizes Hegel 
for 'Gothic Heaven storming' and for saying that "the 
universe has no strength to resist the courage of knowledge" 
( qtd. in Kaufmann 2 04) . Kaufmann concedes that in these 
criticisms "Nietzsche insinuates that the world is not 
knowable" (Kaufmann 204). so, the question that is of concern 
now is: if 'the world is not knowable' and 'truths are 
illusions' then how can Nietzsche claim to make any assertions 
about the will to power? 
All the above passages which deny the possibility of 
truth can be classified by Kaufmann as only denying a certain 
kind of truth. They only deny the possibility for truth about 
a platonic 'true world' or for truth that exists like the 
Kantian thing-in-itself (hidden from experience). In short, 
the denial of truth is only a denial of metaphysical truth. 
So, for Kaufmann, 'the world' that is not knowable is only the 
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metaphysical world. Wherever Nietzsche denies truth, he must 
be denying truth about another world that is not reachable 
through empirical investigation. This view holds that the 
empirical realm is the only place where Nietzsche believes 
that there is the possibility for knowledge. Furthermore, 
Nietzsche is shown as denying the entire distinction between 
this world and another world like Kant's Noumenal world or a 
Christian after-life. While speaking about the distinction 
between this world and another one, Kaufmann states that 
"Nietzsche, 1 ike Hegel, denied any such dual ism" ( Kaufmann 
354) . 
The empirical interpretation of the will to power can now 
be seen as necessary in Kaufmann. There is no 'other world' 
or thing-in-itself, so, when Nietzsche says that "this world 
is the will to power and nothing besides" (WP 550) he must be 
interpreted as saying that "the constitution of the human mind 
might conceivably require it to interpret not only human 
behavior but the entire cosmos in terms of the will to power" 
(Kaufmann 207). This line from Kaufmann shows that his 
interpretation holds that statements about 'the world' must 
always be understood in terms of our way of experiencing the 
world. This would not lead to subjectivity because "the will 
to power is a universal feature of the human constitution" 
(Kaufmann 206). Considerable emphasis might be placed on the 
word 'This' in 'this world', stressing that the statement, 
'This world is a will to power' is not about some 
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transcendent, metaphysical world (that world) but about the 
empirical world that is accessible to human experience. 
Kaufmann's interpretation has to portray Nietzsche as viewing 
the will to power as a strictly human explanation of the world 
because there is no possibility for true statements about a 
'real world' that is not accessible to human experience. In 
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy Clark verifies that Kaufmann 
interprets Nietzsche as rejecting metaphysical reality. 
He [Kaufmann] attempts to explain away Nietzsche's 
apparent denial of truth as a denial of what Nietzsche 
called the "true world", the supersensuous and eternal 
world of the platonic forms or the Kantian thing-in-
itself. (Clark 5) 
Part of what Clark is telling us here is that Kaufmann' s 
Nietzsche does not just discredit the idea of having knowledge 
about metaphysical reality, he denies the existence of 
metaphysical reality. 
Now that more information has been given, it is 
interesting to take another look at passage number thirty six 
in part two of Beyond Good and Evil in light of Kaufmann's 
interpretation. Even though the passage is thought to be 
supportive of a metaphysical view there is much within it that 
coheres with what Kaufmann is saying. Three sections from 
this passage are particularly relevant to Kaufmann's 
interpretation. The first is from the top of the passage. 
Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our 
world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, 
or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our 
drives .... is it not permitted to make the experiment and 
to ask the question whether this "given" would not be 
sufficient for also understanding on the basis of this 
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kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") 
world? I mean, not as deception, as mere "appearance," 
an "idea" ..• but as holding the same rank of reality as 
our effect- (BGE 47) 
section actually fits Kaufmann's interpretation 
perfectly. His interpretation holds that the will to power 
is understood, by Nietzsche, to be the basic drive of human 
behavior. This gets extended, and the will to power is then 
seen as the basic drive of the material world as well. This 
is how Kaufmann explains the development of the will to power 
from a psychological theory, to one that explains the outer 
world. In this section there is the same thing going on when 
the "given" reality of our drives is extended to the material 
world. Another interesting point about this section is that 
what is "given" is presumed to be all we can know, and after 
it is applied to the material world, we are told that it is 
not simply "appearance" or "idea". This can be seen as 
supporting the part of Kaufmann's interpretation that says 
that the empirical world is not merely a representation or 
appearance of some deeper 'noumenal' world but that the 
empirical world is an independent, self-sufficient reality. 
The next section that is relevant to Kaufmann is where 
Nietzsche associates himself with the psychological conception 
of the will to power. 
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire 
instinctive life as the development and ramification 
of one basic form of will-namely, of the will to 
power, as my proposition has it; (BGE 48) 
It is important to point out that this is the only part of 
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the entire passage with which Nietzsche directly associates 
himself. The rest of the premises are put forward as 
hypothetical or as steps in an experiment. The fact that he 
only directly connects himself to this idea that the will to 
power explains our instinctual life, implies that this is the 
only part of the passage that he holds to be certain. This 
fits with Kaufmann's idea that Nietzsche meant the will to 
power to be essentially psychological ( assuming that 
psychological and instinctual can mean roughly the same thing 
here). 
Finally, the last line of the passage, which acts as the 
conclusion, can be seen in the context of Kaufmann's 
interpretation. 
The world viewed from inside, the world defined and 
determined according to its "intelligible character"- it 
would be "will to power" and nothing else.(BGE 48) 
The use of the term 'intelligible character' here can be seen 
as implying that the entire passage is about the empirical 
world that is open to human experience. There is no claim 
that the traditional idea of a metaphysical 'true world' is 
being defined. Only the intelligible character of the world 
is being dealt with. Viewing it through Kaufmann's 
explanation, this phrase takes away the preponderance of 
making a metaphysical assumption about the nature of the 
universe and limits the statement to dealing with what we can 
deduce from our experience and experimentation. 
Now that Kaufmann's ideas about the nature of the will 
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to power have been examined, and his possible interpretation 
of certain passages has been given, it is appropriate to move 
on to Heidegger's interpretation. Both criticism and support 





Heidegger's approach to Nietzsche differs greatly from 
that of Kaufmann. While Kaufmann' s interpretation can be 
classified as methodical, Heidegger's is more sweeping. In 
fact, there are times when calling it cryptic is an 
understatement. One gets a better sense of this after 
realizing that the style of Heidegger's presentation is very 
similar to Nietzsche's own writings. The similarity lies in 
the poetic nature of both philosophers' work, as well as in 
the sense of urgency that prevails throughout. Kaufmann's 
approach is much more structured and sedate than that of 
either Heidegger or Nietzsche. Another way that Heidegger is 
unlike Kaufmann is that Heidegger has a personal 'stake' in 
what Nietzsche is stating about the will to power. This 
'stake' exists because Nietzsche plays a prominent role in 
Heidegger's own philosophical theory about the history of 
Being. Because of this connection Heidegger's interpretation 
must always be viewed with a certain amount of suspicion. The 
suspicion stems from the fact that he is not looking at 
Nietzsche with any amount of objectivity. As we shall see, 
this lack of obj ecti vi ty in Heidegger's interpretation is 
something which Heidegger readily admits. Rather than 
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implying that his own interpretation is self-serving, though, 
Heidegger states that in order to represent a thinker's ideas 
accurately one must think from the same perspective as that 
thinker. For Heidegger, there is no virtue in an 'objective' 
interpretation of a philosopher. 
Information on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche 
will come primarily from the first two volumes of his four 
volume set entitled Nietzsche. The content of these volumes 
is basically a collection of his lectures and essays on the 
subject of Nietzsche. These writings and lectures were 
formulated over a period of time from 1936 to the early 
1950 1 s. Part two of volume 2 is a lecture entitled "Who is 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" and it has been reprinted in The New 
Nietzsche. The reprinted version will be the version used in 
this paper. 
As stated, the only way that Heidegger believes an 
understanding of another thinker can be reached is through 
closely following that thinker's thought process. In Volume 
1 of Nietzsche Heidegger explains his method of 
interpretation. 
Confrontation is genuine criticism. It is the supreme 
way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker. 
In confrontation we undertake to follow his thinking and 
to trace it in its effective force, not in its weakness. 
To what purpose? In order that through the confrontation 
we ourselves may become free for the supreme 
exertion of thinking. (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 4-5) 
Here, it is evident that Heidegger believes that a very 
a personal relationship with a philosopher's ideas is needed 
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if one is to comprehend and evaluate them fully. Furthermore, 
the last line of the passage points to the other subjective 
aspect of Heidegger's interpretation. What is being 
interpreted must be thought out correctly because it is part 
of how 'we' must think presently. The point of reaching an 
understanding of a past thinker, for Heidegger, is to better 
develop a new position which is bound to the past theory. The 
new position must also move beyond the past theory. This 
connection between current thought and past ideas is an 
important one for Heidegger. In Volume 1 he speaks about the 
possibility of misunderstanding Nietzsche's doctrines of 
eternal recurrence and the will to power and the implications 
that this would have. Not only would we "comprehend nothing 
of the twentieth century and of the centuries to come" but we 
would also be unable to understand "our own metaphysical 
task"(Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 17). Heidegger, showing himself 
to be different from Kaufmann again, has a specific idea as 
to what our current 'metaphysical task' is. He sees his own 
attitude towards Being as the direction in which Nietzsche 
points us. Kaufmann, on the other hand, attempts to give his 
interpretation an objective or scientific tone. 
Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is fulfilling a certain 
role in the history of western metaphysics. He sees 
Nietzsche's entire philosophy as an answer to "the ancient 
guiding question of philosophy, 'What is being?'" (Heidegger, 
1979, V.1, 4). The question of 'being' is the major concern 
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of all philosophy for Heidegger and he is convinced that the 
significance of Nietzsche as a thinker lies in his ability to 
realize this guiding question of philosophy, and answer it 
with the concept of the "will to power". This is made 
evident right away in Heidegger's interpretation. 
Nietzsche unfolds the guiding question of philosophy and 
responds to it (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 4) 
As the name for the basic character of all beings, the 
expression "will to power" provides an answer to the 
question "What is being?" (1979, V.1, 4) 
The name "will to power" must therefore come to stand in 
the title of the chief philosophical work of a thinker 
who says that all being ultimately is will to power. 
(1979, V.1, 4) 
This emphasis on being and the will to power is part of what 
makes Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche a metaphysical 
one. The will to power is, in Heidegger's theory, much more 
than an explanation of human behavior; it is "the fundamental 
characteristic of all beings, not only of man." (Heidegger, 
1977, 65). This definition of the will to power situates 
Nietzsche within the history of metaphysics, for Heidegger, 
and forms the necessary background to Heidegger's own 
metaphysical theories. Heidegger's argument for this 
conception of the will to power will be outlined, but first 
another difference with Kaufmann has to be pointed out. 
In Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche, he makes it 
clear that the will to power is to be viewed as a concept that 
undergoes an evolution. The idea started off as a specific 
motivation for some of the negative behavioral traits of 
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Wagne! and steadily evolved, through observation and 
experimentation, into an explanation for all human behavior. 
He sees this evolution as taking place in Nietzsche's 
published works and does not give a lot of clout to the 
collection of unpublished notes entitled The Will to Power. 
In fact he recommends that this work be completely dissociated 
from the published material. 
Possibly still more fateful was his sister's decision to 
patch together some of the thousands of jottings, 
scribbles, and notes which Nietzsche had accumulated 
over a period of years ... and to publish this fabrication 
as his system, under the title The Will to Power. 
(Kaufmann 6) 
In a later passage, Kaufmann blatantly asserts his denial of 
the importance of The Will to Power. 
Yet it is significant that The Will to Power was not, as 
is so often supposed, Nietzsche's last work; (Kaufmann 7) 
Heidegger has a very different view of the will to power 
which directly affects his view of the work, The Will to 
Power. In Heidegger's interpretation the will to power is a 
concept that is arrived at through reflection and not 
experimentation. He expresses open contempt for the whole 
empirical process that Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche as 
embracing. In "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" Heidegger 
states his hostility towards empirical knowledge being 
associated with any interpretation of Nietzsche. 
Because of the peculiar ascendancy of modern science, we 
modern men are ensnared in the singular error that holds 
that knowledge can be obtained from science ...... that 
which is unique in what a thinker is able to express can 
neither be demonstrated nor refuted logically or 
empirically. (Heidegger, 1977, 74) 
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The reflection that Heidegger sees Nietzsche engaging in 
instead of empirical experimentation is the 'question of 
being' mentioned earlier. This question of being is viewed 
as a constant concern of Nietzsche's that can be seen in all 
of his writings. So, when the concept of the will to power 
is incorporated into Nietzsche's thought as the 'character of 
all beings' it is not the result of an 'evolution' but the 
result of a constant asking of the same question. Heidegger 
states that the metaphysical concept of the will to power was 
a part of all of Nietzsche's writings which finally found 
expression in the project, The Will to Power . 
.. the fundamental position on the basis of which he 
speaks in these and in all the writings he himself 
published, did not assume a final form and was not itself 
published in any book ... What Nietzsche himself published 
was always a foreground .. His philosophy proper was left 
behind as posthumous, unpublished work. (Heidegger, 1979, 
V.1, 9) 
Not only does this quote show Heidegger's commitment to The 
Will to Power as a viable source of Nietzsche's thought, it 
also represents all of Nietzsche's published work as leading 
up to this final book. Everything that Nietzsche wrote is 
seen, not as a development, but as an attempt at an expression 
of one 'fundamental position'. This position is his attempt 
at an answer to the 'question of being'. So, Heidegger sees 
The Will to Power as the ultimate expression of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. All his previous works are considered valuable, 
but inadequate, expressions of this main point he wished to 
convey. On the other hand, Kaufmann sees The Will to Power 
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as a unnatural collection of notes with questionable relevance 
to anything Nietzsche believed. 
While Kaufmann sees Nietzsche as going through a 
development in his published works, Heidegger sees Nietzsche 
as being a part of the larger development of western 
metaphysics. He makes the past influences on Nietzsche clear 
and places a great deal of importance on his role in the 
history of philosophy. The best way to describe this 
historical importance is to look at how Heidegger describes 
it in "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" from volume 2 of 
Nietzsche. Heidegger describes Thus spoke Zarathustra as the 
'vestibule' for The Will to Power, so, it is safe to say that 
he views the former as the most important of the published 
writings (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 12). This lecture not only 
lays out Heidegger's views on Nietzsche's historical 
importance, it also gives insight into the will to power and 
its relation to being. 
Early on in the lecture, Heidegger picks out a line from 
the section "On the Tarantulas" that he feels is highly 
significant. 
For that man be delivered from revenge, that is the 
bridge to the highest hope for me, and a rainbow after 
long storms.(Z 211) 
Heidegger then goes on to examine closely this idea of revenge 
expressed by Zarathustra. Another line is quoted in order to 
get a better idea of what revenge connotes. This line comes 
from "On Deliverance". 
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The spirit of revenge, my friends, has so far been the 
subject of man's best reflection;"(Z 252) 
This line is interpreted as stating that revenge is the 
motivation for mankind's metaphysical thinking. Heidegger 
takes 'reflection' to mean more than just thinking here. He 
says that it is "that thinking in which man's relation to what 
is, to all beings, is grounded and attuned" (Heidegger, 1977, 
70). He goes on to describe this 'reflection' as indicative 
of how man represents being. Heidegger states that this 
representation and relation to being depicts being with 
reference to its Being. This description of 'reflection' as 
a depiction of the 'Being of beings' is a description of what 
it means to think metaphysically, and the spirit of revenge 
is an integral part of it. Heidegger affirms this: 
In understanding revenge as the spirit that attunes and 
determines man's relation to beings, Nietzsche conceives 
revenge metaphysically from the start. (Heidegger, 1977, 
71) 
Now that it is clear that revenge is deeply connected to 
past metaphysical thought, it is necessary to look further 
into its definition. Heidegger points to the literal meaning 
of the word which includes the activity of 'driving out' or 
'banishing'. He goes on to give a more detailed definition 
which involves a description of 'avenging persecution'. 
Now, 
It opposes its object by degrading it so that, by 
contrasting the degraded object with its own superiority, 
it may restore its own validity, .. (Heidegger, 1977, 71) 
revenge can be defined as 'opposing degrading 
persecution'. In order to figure out how revenge fits within 
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the structure of metaphysics, Heidegger says that the 
'essential character' in which the Being of beings appears 
within modern metaphysics must be observed. This makes sense 
since the spirit of revenge is apparently what sparks the 
pursuit of the Being of beings in the first place. 
Heidegger cites a few lines by Schelling in order to 
describe how Being is depicted in all of modern metaphysics. 
In the final and highest instance there is no being other 
than willing. Willing is primal being and to it 
[willing] alone belong all (primal being's] predicates: 
being unconditioned, eternity, independence of time, 
self-affirmation .... (qtd. in Heidegger,1977, 71) 
Heidegger states that this passage signifies 'willing' as the 
Being of beings. He believes that this concept of 'will' as 
Being prevails throughout modern thought. This can be 
described as a shift in thinking, where the modern period 
employed 'primacy of practice' over 'primacy of theory'. 
Another way to describe this shift is by stating that the 
modern period focussed on the question of how to live ones 
life while previously the focus of philosophy was on abstract 
reasoning. Modern metaphysics, which includes Kant, Fichte, 
Hegel, Schopenhauer, etc., can be seen as being dominated by 
this idea of 'Primacy of practice' or 'will'. Heidegger 
states that Nietzsche is operating under this same historical 
notion of will when he recognizes the Being of beings as the 
will to power. 
Now that it has been stated that the Being of beings in 
modern metaphysics has been depicted as 'will' , Heidegger 
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turns his attention back to revenge. He quotes another line 
from "On Deliverance" which tells us more about the specific 
connection between revenge and metaphysics. 
This .•. is revenge itself: the will's aversion to time 
and its 'It was'.(Z 252) 
Heidegger explains that the aversion to "time and its 'It 
was'" is in fact an aversion to the passing of time, or more 
specifically to transience in general. Now it becomes clear 
(when we remember the previous description of avenging) that 
the history of modern metaphysics involves the 'will' being 
put forth in order to 'degrade' transience, so that this 
eternal 'will' can restore its own validity. The whole 
concept of the 'will' as Being is prompted by revenge, and the 
will's desire to overcome transience is the form that this 
revenge takes . Heidegger equates transience with 'this 
world', the 'earthly' or the 'temporal', so what is being 
communicated here is somewhat familiar. Metaphysics is being 
represented as the positing of eternal ideas (the will) for 
the purpose of degrading 'this world' to the point of 
disappearance. Heidegger expresses this exact idea about half 
way through "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?". 
For Nietzsche, the most profound revenge consists of that 
reflection [metaphysical thought] which posits eternal 
ideas [the will] as the absolute, compared with 
which the temporal [the earthly] must degrade itself to 
actual non-being. (Heidegger, 1977, 73) 
The parenthetical inserts are put in to help better understand 
this result of Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger looks to the 
possibility of an alternative to the situation where the 
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'will' is exalted as the Being of beings, and 'this world' is 
devoid of all Being. 
The first line from this discussion was Zarathustra 
expressing the hope that man be delivered from revenge. 
Heidegger points out that a deliverance from revenge would be 
a deliverance from the 'will' having the status of the Being 
of beings. 
To the extent that the Being of beings is will in modern 
metaphysical theory, deliverance from the will would, 
simultaneously, be deliverance from Being, a fall into 
empty nothingness. (Heidegger, 1977, 73) 
Here, Heidegger accurately describes the possibility of 
'nihilism' . After exposing past metaphysics as a form of 
revenge, there is the danger of having nothing to base 
existence on, having no 'Being' left. However, Heidegger's 
interpretation holds that while deliverance from revenge is 
deliverance from what is 'repugnant' in the will, it is not 
an elimination of all willing (Heidegger, 1977, 73). 
Deliverance liberates aversion from its no, and frees it 
for a yes. What does this yes affirm? Precisely what 
the aversion of the spirit of revenge negates: time, 
transience. (Heidegger, 1977, 74) 
So, instead of degrading transience the 'will' affirms it and 
is thus delivered from the revenge of past metaphysics that 
posited the eternal in order to eliminate the temporal. 
At this point in the interpretation, one may notice that 
this does not sound all that different from Kaufmann. The 
idea that we must reject the metaphysical 'true world' in 
favor of 'this world' is right in line with Kaufmann' s 
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conception of the will to power as relating to the temporal. 
But, it will be shown that Heidegger's idea of Nietzsche's 
concept of 'will' is anything but temporal. 
Instead of merely rejecting the metaphysical and having 
the 'will' affirm the temporal, Heidegger believes that 
Nietzsche raises the temporal to the status of the 
metaphysical. He sees this as being accomplished through the 
doctrine of 'eternal recurrence of the same' . In this theory, 
the characteristics of transience remain, (passing away, 
ceasing to be) but that which passes away is represented as 
returning again in the same form, or as Heidegger puts it "as 
self same in its coming" (Heidegger, 1977, 74). Furthermore, 
this returning is eternal. That which passes away returns 
again, only to pass away and return once again 'ad infinitum'. 
This eternal quality is what gives this explanation of time 
its metaphysical status. Heidegger reminds us that "the 
predicate 'eternal' belongs to the Being of beings" 
(Heidegger, 1977, 74). The Being of beings can now be 
represented as this doctrine of 'eternal recurrence of the 
same' which affirms the temporal. The 'will', by itself, is 
no longer the answer to "what is Being?" 
The 'will' still plays a part in this new definition of 
Being, though. Heidegger demonstrates this by invoking a line 
of Nietzsche's which he believes, "gathers together the main 
point of his thinking" (Heidegger, 1977, 75). 
To impress the character of Being upon becoming-that is 
the highest will to power. (WP 330) 
46 
Heidegger interprets this quote as stating; 
The highest will to power-that is the life force in all 
life-is to represent transience as fixed becoming 
within the Eternal Recurrence of the same, and so to 
render it secure and stable. (Heidegger, 1977, 75) 
In other words, the will to power is what is behind the theory 
of eternal recurrence. The will to power is the force that 
impresses the eternal quality of recurrence upon the temporal, 
thereby making it stable. 'Fixed Becoming' is to be understood 
as transience that is no longer transient because the will to 
power has posited eternal recurrence as the stabilizing factor 
in an otherwise chaotic world that is constantly slipping 
away. If eternal recurrence is the representation of the 
eternal Being of beings then the will to power is what prompts 
this representation. Clark states that in Heidegger's view 
the will to power is the essence of being and eternal 
recurrence is the mode of existence, and that together they 
answer the question of Being (Clark 9). Heidegger states: 
Whoever neglects to think the thought of eternal 
recurrence together with will to power ... cannot 
adequately grasp the metaphysical content of the 
doctrine of the will to power in its full scope. 
(Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 21) 
In this passage it is evident that Heidegger believes these 
concepts to be interwoven with each other and that the will 
to power is metaphysical. In volume 2 of Nietzsche Heidegger 
blatantly asserts that eternal recurrence is a manifestation 
of the will to power. 
It [Eternal Return] is true because it is just in that 
it brings the essence of the Will to Power to appearance 
in its highest figure. The Will to Power as the 
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fundamental character of being justifies the Eternal 
Return of the Same as the "appearance" in whose radiance 
the highest triumph of the Will to Power radiates (qtd. 
in Fynsk 83) 
Now it is clear that the will to power is the essence of all 
being and that, according to Nietzsche's conception, it 
appears in its highest form as eternal recurrence which makes 
the transient eternal. 
A brief explanation of the subjective character of the 
'will' in Heidegger's interpretation is necessary here. While 
the will to power is represented as a metaphysical concept 
that has an impact reaching far beyond human motivation, it 
is nonetheless a subjective notion. Heidegger sees all 
metaphysical thought since Descartes as placing the subject 
in a position of dominance to everything that is, making all 
recent metaphysical thought subjective. Man is seen as the 
founding 'subject' for which everything else is 'object' 
(Fynsk 74). This, Heidegger believes, is a result of 
Descartes' 'First Meditation', which made the human being the 
ultimate source of deciding what is to count as being. 
Therefore, it is key to remember that the 'will', which has 
been represented as dominating modern metaphysical thought, 
is metaphysical, yet subjective. This 'Will' that Nietzsche 
posits in the will to power is also subjective, but the big 
difference is that it does not come from the 'conscious 
spirit' like the will of his predecessors (Schelling, Hegel 
etc.); it comes from the body and its corporating drives 
(Clark 10). The significance of this conception of the 'will' 
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as stemming from the body or the 'animalitus' will be examined 
shortly. While this difference apparently puts Nietzsche at 
odds with modern thought, it remains to be shown how he is 
actually very much a part of modern metaphysics. 
At this point, Heidegger notes that there is an obvious 
criticism to the line of thought that has been represented so 
far. The "deliverance" from the form of revenge which 
degraded the transient with eternal ideas seems still to be 
trapped in the same spirit of revenge. There is still a 
'will' that has 'an aversion to time', it is just expressing 
itself as eternal recurrence here which lifts up the transient 
and not as an absolute which degrades the transient. 
Heidegger sees this problem with "deliverance" and states that 
Nietzsche is also aware of it. Rather than seeing Nietzsche's 
awareness of deliverance as a problem, Heidegger thinks that 
Nietzsche is merely acknowledging that he is moving within the 
"spirit of reflection-to-date" (Heidegger, 1977, 76). It is 
clear that 'Reflection-to-date' (or modern metaphysics) has 
been characterized as a form of revenge by Nietzsche. By 
developing this new theory of the will to power and eternal 
recurrence, Nietzsche appears to wish to break out of, or be 
delivered from, the revenge that has characterized past 
thought. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche has done more than 
achieve deliverance from revenge. Nietzsche is depicted as 
ending the entire chapter in philosophy that has been 
motivated by revenge. The following line from volume 1 of 
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Nietzsche substantiates this. 
The age whose accomplishment unfolds in [Nietzsche's] 
thought, the modern period, is an end period. (qtd. in 
Fynsk 70) 
Heidegger's realization that Nietzsche was not 
transcending modern metaphysics, but instead, bringing it to 
a close, rests on his interpreting the will to power and 
eternal recurrence in conjunction with the deliverance from 
revenge. The view that these concepts are not deliverance 
from revenge but, instead, a completion of the era that has 
been motivated by revenge, makes Nietzsche's understanding of 
the era in question significant. 
Heidegger states: 
In Volume 1 of Nietzsche 
What alone must concern us is the trace that his path of 
thinking towards the will to power has drawn in the 
history of Being ... (qtd. in Fynsk 70) 
As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Heidegger's 
main concern with Nietzsche lies in the role that he plays in 
the history of metaphysics. The 'trace in the history of 
Being' that is so important to Heidegger is the role that 
Nietzsche plays in bringing about the end of metaphysics. 
The lengthy discussion of revenge is used to show how 
Heidegger views Nietzsche's concepts of the will to power and 
eternal return as a reaction to past metaphysics. Again, we 
see this sentiment expressed in Volume 1. 
The conception of the Being of all beings as will is very 
much in line with the best and greatest tradition of 
German philosophy (Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 34) 
Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is important not only 
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because of his placement at the end of modern metaphysics, but 
because he sees brilliance in his ability to notice the 
patterns of thought that led up to his own role in history. 
While Nietzsche's notion of 'will' is consistent with that of 
his predecessors, in that it is apparently closely connected 
to the spirit of revenge, the differences between his theory 
and those of the past are what distinguish him in Heidegger's 
eyes. One must remember though, that it is because Nietzsche 
is trapped in the spirit of 'reflection-to-date' that his 
radical theories, which are so different from those of the 
past, serve to end 'reflection to date' . For Heidegger, 
Nietzsche must remain inside the tradition of metaphysics in 
order to bring it to a close. The characteristics of the will 
to power and eternal recurrence are viewed, by Heidegger, as 
an "exhaustion of the final possibilities of the metaphysical 
tradition and therefore an accomplishment of modern 
metaphysics." (Fynsk 75). At this point, the reason why these 
theories are so radical must be pointed out. 
Heidegger believes that the doctrine of eternal return 
is referred to as Nietzsche's "most abysmal thought" 
(Heidegger, 1977, 78) because it is the last thought of 
metaphysics-to-date. The positing of the eternal onto the 
transient is, in essence, insisting that being both becomes 
and is. This response to the guiding question of philosophy 
"what is being?" harkens back to ancient metaphysics. It 
combines Hereclitean and Parmenidean responses in answering 
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the 'guiding question' and hence, Heidegger believes, closes 
the circle of metaphysics (Heidegger, 1979, V.2, 252). After 
this contradictory concept of being is put forth, Heidegger 
believes that there is nowhere left for metaphysical thought 
to go. The image of the eagle and the snake soaring through 
the air in wide circles at the end of "Who is Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra?" represents this closing of the circle of 
metaphysical thought ( in Heidegger's view) . By bringing 
metaphysics full circle Nietzsche apparently allows for no 
further advancement in the subject of metaphysics. Instead, 
he is seen as pointing the way towards a new way of thinking. 
And when a way of thinking brings metaphysics to 
completion, it points in an exceptional sense toward 
something unthought, something clear and confused at the 
same time.(Heidegger, 1977, 77) 
It was mentioned earlier that Heidegger sees his own 
philosophy as picking up at this point where Nietzsche has 
left off. 
The will to power with its subjective nature is another 
contributing factor to Heidegger's view of Nietzsche as the 
one who brings metaphysics to its completion. The will to 
power, while subjective, is not subjective in the traditional 
sense. It (the will) is understood on the basis of the body 
and its corporating drives. This takes the traditional 
metaphysical view and inverts it. Instead of the 
'rationalitas' (intellect) defining the essence of the 'animal 
rationale' (the human being) the 'animalitas' or bodily drives 
now become the dominant aspect of the definition of human 
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beings. The Bodily drives become dominant because they are 
seen as 'that which lies at the basis of' or the 
'unconditioned subject' which is the will to power. Heidegger 
believes that this inversion of the ancient metaphysical idea 
of the make up of a human being is part Nietzsche's plan to 
take metaphysics to its limit, to think it through to its last 
possible thought, and therefore to complete it (Fynsk 75). 
It is important to mention that this view of the will having 
an association with the body or the 'animali tus' did not 
originate with Nietzsche. Schopenhauer is known for having 
this same conviction. In order for Nietzsche to be the one 
who completes metaphysics his theory of the will must go 
farther than this (if not, then metaphysics ends with 
Schopenhauer). Fortunately for Heidegger, Nietzsche's theory 
does go farther. The concept of eternal recurrence and its 
contradictory conception of being is what takes Nietzsche 
beyond what Schopenhauer has done. Heidegger believes that 
Nietzsche's use of the will's connection to the body takes the 
subjectivity of modern metaphysics, that began with Descartes, 
to its limit by performing the inversion discussed above. 
This contributes to (but does not singlehandedly accomplish) 
the completion of metaphysics. Furthermore, it was shown 
that the will to power is given expression in the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence. So, the final blow to metaphysics that 
Heidegger believes is delivered with the concept of eternal 
return can ultimately be attributed to the will to power and 
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its 'aversion to transience'. 
Now that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's 
concepts of eternal recurrence and the will to power has been 
presented and the historical importance that Heidegger 
attributes to these ideas has been illustrated, it is 
appropriate to look at passage number thirty six from Beyond 
Good and Evil. Considering the amount of time that was 
devoted to Kaufmann' s probable assessment of this passage it 
is seems necessary to view it through Heidegger's eyes as 
well. But before this is done, a brief look at Heidegger's 
view of Nietzsche's conception of truth is needed. 
It was shown earlier that Kaufmann views the passages 
where Nietzsche denies the possibility of truth as merely a 
denial of metaphysical truth about a 'true world' . Heidegger, 
on the other hand, views Nietzsche's denial of truth as a 
denial of all truth. The concept of truth in this 
interpretation is very similar to the concept of eternal 
return that has been outlined. Like eternal return, truth is 
seen as a manifestation of the will to power. Both concepts 
'fix' or give the quality of stability to the transient world. 
They both impress 'Being on becoming'. Nietzsche is seen as 
putting forth his idea of truth in this sense and then 
comparing it to the idea of truth as correspondence to 
reality. Fynsk describes Heidegger's position on Nietzsche 
accurately in Heidegger: Thought and Historicity . 
... the truth, for Nietzsche, is not in accord with what 
is properly real. The truth is thus essentially in 
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error; it is an appearance, an illusion. (Fynsk 82) 
Here we see that Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as viewing all 
truth as 'error' because it does not correspond to reality. 
In this interpretation, the truth, like eternal return, is an 
expression of the will to power. The will to power, for 
Heidegger, is related to bodily drives and is the essence of 
all being or 'what is properly real'; it is also chaotic and 
unstable. Chessick describes accurately this chaotic nature 
of the will to power in A Brief Introduction to the Genius of 
Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche, the nature of being is a continual 
clashing, a continual overcoming, a continual shaping 
and breaking, creating and destroying, in flux and 
change. (Chessick 65) 
The will to power is chaotic reality that gives itself the 
'appearance' of stability through concepts such as truth and 
eternal recurrence (Fynsk 82-4). The will to power, in this 
sense, has an aversion to its own transient nature and thus 
creates these 'stabilizing' concepts. The following line from 
The Will to Power represents this view of truth as an error 
or illusion. 
Truth is the kind of error without which a certain 
species of life could not live (WP 272). 
This line states that while truth posited by the will to power 
is necessary, it is not accurate in the sense of corresponding 
to reality. For Heidegger, reality is the will to power which 
is chaotic and truth is an expression of the will to power, 
but truth does not represent the will to power's chaotic 
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nature. Truth "makes all being thinkable" (Z 225) but this 
representation of being is not an accurate one. The question 
of how the will to power can be put forth as true (as reality 
or the essence of being) while Nietzsche denies all truth is 
not troubling to Heidegger because he believes that this 
contradiction is simply a call for a new conception of truth 
(Clark 7-9). Clark warns us that Heidegger has 'little 
incentive' to eliminate the apparent contradictions in 
Nietzsche. 
[Heidegger's) use of Nietzsche's philosophy to support 
his own depends on interpreting it so that Nietzsche's 
claims about truth and metaphysics are inconsistent with 
his practice. (Clark 7) 
The denial of all truth is like Nietzsche's denial of 
metaphysics. Heidegger sees him as attacking these concepts 
from within. Nietzsche is seen as rejecting all previous 
metaphysics only to bring the subject to a close with his own 
metaphysical theories of the will to power and eternal return 
which have elements of previous metaphysical thought. 
Similarly he attacks the notion of truth based on its lack of 
correspondence to his own conception of the true essence of 
reality (the 'chaotic' will to power). Again the apparent 
contradictions here do not trouble Heidegger since he sees 
Nietzsche's philosophy as signifying the end of traditional 
ideas about truth and metaphysics. In fact, it was 
demonstrated earlier how the contradictions actually 
strengthen Heidegger's position. 
Now that Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will 
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to power has been thoroughly examined, his probable reaction 
to passage number thirty six from Beyond Good and Evil can be 
illustrated. Clark refers to this passage as the only 
published argument for the metaphysical view of the will to 
power. She makes this assertion based on the fact that the 
Will to Power was never published, and in her opinion Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra is too poetic and metaphorical to be taken 
seriously. It was mentioned earlier that Heidegger put great 
stock in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Why he considered it 
important and the conception of the will to power that he drew 
from that work have been presented. In The Will to Power one 
could find many passages defending a metaphysical view of the 
will to power. These passages are much less problematic then 
the one Clark cites in Beyond Good and Evil, but, since they 
can be dismissed by Kaufmann as irrelevant simply because of 
their origin, Heidegger's interpretation will be applied to 
passage number thirty six. 
This passage from Beyond Good and Evil presents a 
challenge to those who wish to interpret the will to power as 
a metaphysical doctrine. As was shown in the chapter on 
Kaufmann, the passage is full of empirical language. For 
Heidegger's interpretation to fit with the text here, the 
focus must be shifted away from the many places where 
Nietzsche declares that he is performing an "experiment", 
dealing with that which is "given", or presenting a 
"hypothesis". For Heidegger, the contention that the will to 
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power is metaphysical (an answer to the question of being) 
must be a constant throughout Nietzsche's thought and not the 
result of empirical observation. Also, the theories that 
Nietzsche expresses in this passage must be the result of a 
priori reflection if Heidegger's interpretation is to apply. 
The three sections of this passage that were applied to 
Kaufmann's view will now be viewed through Heidegger's eyes. 
The section that presents the view that the will to power 
is intimately connected to our "instinctual life" was seen as 
supporting Kaufmann's psychological view because it appears 
to be the only section that Nietzsche directly attributes to 
his own thinking. However, this association with "instinctual 
life" is not necessarily akin to stating that the will to 
power is about human psychological processes. Earlier on in 
the passage Nietzsche defines his use of 'instinctual life' . 
... a kind of instinctual life in which all organic 
functions, together with self-regulation, assimilation, 
nourishment, excretion, metabolism, are still 
synthetically bound together-as an antecedent form of 
life (BGE 47) 
This section of the passage clearly shows that 'instinctual' 
does not necessarily mean the same thing as psychological (as 
was assumed in chapter two). The 'instinctual life' does not 
refer to just human life, but to all life and its 'organic 
functions'. Furthermore, the statement that the instinctual 
life is an 'antecedent form of life' (all life) implies that 
it is a condition for life. Since Nietzsche is so confident 
that the will to power is closely connected to the 
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instinctual, it seems plausible that he is stating that the 
will to power is a condition for all life here. This is not 
to be confused with a Darwinian kind of evolutionary theory. 
The will to power may be the condition for all life, but it 
is still without direction or structure. This scenario fits 
closely with the Heideggerian idea that the will to power is 
the character of all beings, and more importantly, it takes 
away one of the empirical interpretations of this passage. 
Kaufmann' s interpretation was shown to be compatible with 
the first paragraph of the passage as well. This section 
depicts our own drives and passions as all we can know, and 
from this knowledge we can supposedly hypothesize about the 
external, material world. This fits with Kaufmann's theory 
that Nietzsche viewed the will to power as, first and 
foremost, a theory about human behavior. However, this same 
passage can be viewed as supporting a metaphysical stance. 
Clark points out that the picture that this passage paints is 
not one that could be formed from experience. It actually 
flies in the face of our experience to think that our own 
drives are all we can know. This position is one that could 
only be reached through a priori reflection (Clark 213). This 
type of reflection is indicative of metaphysical thinking and 
Heidegger's view of Nietzsche. While Heidegger would not want 
to focus on the division between an inner world and an 
external one here, he would be encouraged by the subjective 
viewpoint suggested. The view that our inner world is all 
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that is certain harkens back to Descartes' philosophy which 
initiated the modern period of subjectivity. Heidegger 
believes that Nietzsche brought this period to a close with 
the subjective notion of the will to power. The will to power 
is related to the body and its natural 'drives' , so the 
section in question could be viewed from Heidegger's 
standpoint as, not making a leap from the inner world to the 
external one, but as positing the will to power as the essence 
of all being (the human being as well as external being). 
Finally, Kaufmann's possible interpretation of the last 
sentence in the passage was looked at. This last sentence 
appears to be a blatant assertion of a metaphysical will to 
power. 
The world viewed from inside, the world defined and 
determined according to its "intelligible character"- it 
would be "will to power" and nothing else. (BGE 48) 
To fit this with Kaufmann, the term 'intelligible character' 
was focused on. This term implied that the statement was 
about the way we understand the world and not about the way 
the world really is. Heidegger's interpretation, on the other 
hand, would view this statement as solely metaphysical. It 
would focus on the 'the world' being viewed from 'inside' and 
take this to mean that Nietzsche is making an assertion about 
the external world. The world defined as the "will to power 
and nothing else" is one of the statements in Nietzsche's 
published writings that comes closest to directly asserting 
the Heideggarian idea that the will to power is the essence 
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of all being. This interpretation would deny that the term 
'intelligible character' · presents a problem. It would simply 
maintain that the way the world truly is, when viewed from 
inside, is in some sense intelligible as the will to power. 
This is different from the world merely appearing as the will 
to power. 
In this chapter, Heidegger has been presented as taking 
a somewhat different approach then Kaufmann to the 
interpretation of Nietzsche's writings. Among the many 
differences that Heidegger has with Kaufmann is Heidegger's 
contention that Nietzsche's philosophy deals primarily with 
answering the metaphysical question "what is being?". Modern 
philosophy is depicted, by Heidegger, as answering this 
question with the concept of 'will'. Nietzsche too is 
pictured as employing the concept of 'will' in order to answer 
this 'grounding question of philosophy'. The will takes on 
the form of 'the will to power' . Heidegger sees this 
metaphysical interpretation of the will to power as being 
supported by the texts, Zarathustra and The Will to Power. 
He also sees 'the question of being' as the aim of all 
Nietzsche's thought. The radical characteristics of the 
concepts that Nietzsche employs in order to define being, in 
Heidegger's view, serve to end modern metaphysics and hence 
all previous metaphysics. In this interpretation, the will 
to power is seen as a subjective concept that is closely 
related to the body and its drives, thereby inverting the 
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traditional conception of the intellect's superiority to the 
body. It is also ultimately chaotic, but has the ability to 
give itself the appearance of stability through the concepts 
of eternal recurrence and truth. The will to power, in 
Heidegger's eyes, represents the end of modern thought (due 
to its radical nature), and it paves the way for a new way of 
thinking in which Heidegger sees himself as participating in. 
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****CHAPTER 4**** 
NIETZSCHE'S VIEWS ON ARTISTIC CREATION 
One particular aspect of the will to power has been left 
out of the two interpretations that have been presented thus 
far. The will to power's relationship to art and the artist 
still needs to be discussed. Once the connection between the 
artist and the will to power is established, an examination 
of how the artist and art function should give some further 
insight into the nature of will to power. 
Before the connection between the artist and the will to 
power is described, the development of Nietzsche's ideas on 
art must be illustrated. It is admitted by most interpreters 
that Nietzsche's conception of art underwent an evolution 
during his career. The Birth of Tragedy gives a detailed 
explanation of the early views that he had on the artistic 
process. In this early text, art is represented by two 
opposing forces, Apollo and Dionysus. The early conception 
of Dionysus is best described by Nietzsche himself. 
Dionysiac stirrings arise either through the influence 
of those narcotic potions of which all primitive races 
speak in their hymns, or through the powerful approach 
of spring, which penetrates with joy the whole frame of 
nature. So stirred the individual forgets himself 
completely. (BT 22) 
The above passage points out some important aspects about this 
early view of the Dionysian. This force in art has a very 
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close tie to nature. In the Dionysian rite, nature "rises 
again to celebrate her reconciliation with her prodigal son, 
man" (BT 23) . One gains a connection to nature that has 
apparently been lost in "civilized" society. Not only is the 
connection between man and nature reinforced but a bond 
between persons is forged. Nietzsche tells us that "each 
individual becomes not only reconciled to his fellow but 
actually at one with him." (BT 23). This oneness is best 
expressed in the "revelling throng" which involves 
intoxication, song and dance, and always a crowd in which one 
can lose one's self and at the same time become part of a 
"higher community". Music also plays an important role in 
facilitating this loss of self. One's newly found connection 
to others and to nature is best expressed by dancing to, or 
better yet, creating music. Music is depicted as the best 
expression of this early view of Dionysian oneness. Another 
feature of the Dionysian is the connection that it has to a 
force that exists in the world. 
The contrast between this truth of nature [Dionysian 
truth] and the pretentious lie of civilization is quite 
similar to that between the eternal core of things and 
the entire phenomenal world. (BT 53) 
It is evident that in this early passage Nietzsche believes 
Dionysian art to have some sort of privileged view of the 
world as it really is. He says that Dionysian art lets us 
become "part of the life force with whose procreative lust we 
have become one" (BT 24). so, among other things this early 
view of the Dionysian involves an understanding of the 
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traditional idea of the 'true world'. 
The Apollonian, in Nietzsche's early conception of art, 
can be seen as the opposite of the Dionysian. While Dionysus 
represents primal oneness and a privileged glimpse of reality, 
Apollo is "the marvelous divine image of the principium 
individuationis, whose looks and gestures radiate the full 
delight, wisdom, and beauty of 'illusion"' (BT 22). The 
Apollonian represents the individual and the power of the 
dream image. It is not concerned with reality but with 
deception. Lingis states in his article "The Will to Power" 
that the plastic arts, confined to the Apollonian realm, are 
appearances without anything appearing. There is no truth in 
the visions that the artist dreams, these visions are fixed 
in their own individuality and are basically hallucinatory. 
These Apollonian images do not reflect nature's "life force" 
but instead represent the individual's power to dream (Lingis 
46) • 
The Birth of Tragedy depicts these two deities ( described 
above) as representing the dual nature of art and artistic 
creation. They are presented as working both with and against 
each other. Eventually this text describes Greek tragedy as 
the synthesis of these two opposing forces. This theory has 
some features which Nietzsche later rejected. The description 
of these opposite forces coming together in order to form 
tragedy is dangerously close to a dialectical theory and 
Nietzsche consistently opposed dialectic systems in his later 
65 
writings. Also, the association of the 'true world' or 
'eternal core of things' with the Dionysian is inconsistent 
with his later rejection of there being any such thing as a 
distinction between the phenomenal world and a 'true world'. 
These refuted ideas (among others in the text) lead Nietzsche 
to refute major portions of The Birth of Tragedy. In "A 
Critical Backward Glance" 1886, which is used as a preface 
for the book, he states that it contains "every conceivable 
fault of adolescence" (BT 5). 
With time, Nietzsche put this dualistic conception of 
art behind him and brought the two opposed deities together 
under the single heading Dionysus. Rose Pfeffer describes the 
transition accurately in Nietzsche, Disciple of Dionysus . 
.•. now Dionysus is no longer only the symbol of chaos 
and destruction; he is also the God of spring and 
production .... He is in fact a synthesis of both chaos and 
form, of orgiastic impulses and visionary states (Pfeffer 
216) 
Nietzsche's mature position on the artistic process can be 
represented as solely Dionysian. In a line from Twilight of 
The Idols he speaks about the faith that "all is redeemed and 
affirmed in the whole" and he 'baptizes' this faith "with the 
name of Dionysus" (TI 554). Further evidence of this 
reconciliation between the opposite forces of art appears in 
a note from The Will to Power. 
"Beauty" is for the artist something outside all orders 
of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed (WP 422) 
So, Nietzsche has a final conception of art which includes the 
opposite characteristics of destruction and creativity, chaos 
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and stability, and truth and illusion. 
represented by Dionysus alone. 
These are all 
Now that the development of Nietzsche's artistic theory 
has been described briefly, it is fitting to investigate the 
connection between artistic creation and the will to power. 
Even though Nietzsche warned his readers that the Birth of 
Tragedy contained errors, over-generalizations, and had a 
certain dialectical spirit that was 'too Hegalian', many of 
his ideas from this time period can be used in order to gain 
information about his final image of the artist. In a note 
from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks he makes clear 
the connection between the activity of the artist and the 
nature of the will to power. 
Heraclitus has no reason to prove ... that this world is 
the best of all possible worlds; it suffices that it is 
the beautiful, innocent play of the Aeon ... And just 
as the child and the artist play, plays the eternally 
active fire-it builds and destroys in innocence. (qtd. in 
Pfeffer 202) 
In this passage Nietzsche points out the similarity between 
the 'eternally active fire' and the 'play' of the artist. 
Neither Kaufmann nor Heidegger's interpretation would deny 
that the reference to this 'fire' can be seen as a reference 
to the will to power. In Kaufmann's interpretation, 'this 
world' that the 'eternal fire' underlies would be seen as the 
world of the mind (with the emphasis on this), while 
Heidegger's interpretation would see 'this world' as 
representing all 'being' that has as its essence, the will to 
power. The most important aspect of this passage is that it 
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shows that the artist, whether the will to power is a 
psychological or a metaphysical concept, is exemplifying the 
will to power. The artist acts in the same way that the will 
to power acts. This is also demonstrated in a note from The 
Will to Power. 
The phenomenon "artist" is still the most transparent:-
to see through it to the basic instincts of power, 
nature, etc.! (WP 419) 
The artist is not necessarily showing the nature of the will 
to power in the art that he/she produces like "a kind of 
mouthpiece for the absolute" (GM 237). Rather, his or her 
actions, in creating the work of art, can be seen as 
exemplifying how the will to power operates. There is a 
subtle difference here: the artist is not a vehicle for the 
expression of the will to power, but, it is through learning 
how the artist behaves that one can see how the will to power 
behaves. This is because the two act in the same manner. 
The true artist, for Nietzsche, is not concerned with 
expressing a type of 'early Dionysian' picture of the world. 
There is not a lifting of "the veil of Maya" (BT 22) in order 
to see the world the way it really is. Instead the artist is 
concerned with illusion and deception. In a note from The 
Will to Power Nietzsche states: 
... truth does not count as the supreme value, even less 
as the supreme power. The will to appearance, to 
illusion, to deception, to becoming and change ... here 
counts as more profound, primeval, "metaphysical" than 
the will to truth, to reality ... (WP 453) 
In a line following this passage Nietzsche calls art the true 
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"metaphysical activity" of life (WP 453), so it is safe to 
assume that the 'will to appearance' is put forth as relating 
to artistic activity. This passage is stating that artistic 
activity is concerned with 'illusion' and 'deception', and is 
more important then so called reality or truth. Also, art is 
concerned with 'becoming' and 'change'; this is an important 
distinction that will be focused on shortly. Further evidence 
of Nietzsche's commitment to viewing art as deception can be 
found in the preface for The Birth of Tragedy (1886). 
For both art and life depend wholly on the laws of 
optics, on perspective and illusion; both, to be blunt, 
depend on the necessity of error.(BT 10) 
Here, the element of untruth in art is explicitly stated. 
Also stated here is the connection between art and life's need 
for illusion. This connection will be discussed next. What 
has already been established is that artistic creation behaves 
like the will to power, and it is essentially concerned with 
deception or appearance. 
Not only artistic creation, but our existence itself, is 
concerned with deception. In The Will to Power Nietzsche 
states that "We have need of lies" and that " .. lies are 
necessary in order to live" (WP 451). He includes metaphysics, 
morality, religion, and science as various ways in which we 
lie to ourselves in order to "have faith in life'' (WP 453). 
Here we see the need for deception in life. The true nature 
of life, for Nietzsche, is chaotic and unstable, so we invent 
concepts such as religion and science and we call them 
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'truths' in order to give stability and order to our lives. 
Nietzsche states this bluntly in another note from his later 
writings. 
Truth is a kind of error without which a certain species 
of life could not live (WP 272) 
The forming of stable institutions or 'truth' gives stability 
to the 'eternally active fire' that is the will to power. 
The idea that 'truth' is a fiction that human beings need in 
order to survive is right in line with Heidegger's 
interpretation. In the chapter on Heidegger it was 
demonstrated that Heidegger sees Nietzsche as viewing 'truth' 
as something which 'stabilizes' the chaotic nature of the will 
to power or 'impresses Being on becoming' . Kaufmann's 
interpretation, on the other hand, would have to deny that 
'stable truth' is a necessary fiction. Kaufmann portrays 
Nietzsche as allowing for the existence of stable empirical 
truths. 
It has been demonstrated that both artistic creation and 
our existence are concerned with lying or with deception, but 
there is an important difference between these two types of 
deception. This difference can be seen in the passage from 
The Will to Power where artistic activity is related to 
'becoming' and 'change'. Rather than creating illusion for 
the purpose of stabilizing or falsifying the chaotic will to 
power, the artist creates illusion for the sake of illusion. 
The artist 'builds and destroys in innocence' just as the will 
to power does . While concepts like truth, religion, and 
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science are put forward by human beings in order to deceive 
themselves about the nature of the will to power, art is put 
forward as a deception for the sake of deception. The fact 
that art is only concerned with creation and not with 
establishing stability makes it similar to the will to power 
which also lacks stability or a specified goal. This is what 
makes art life affirming, it does not attempt to hide the 
chaotic essence of life which is the will to power. Nietzsche 
states that art is an "intoxication with life [and] a will to 
life" (WP 449). It does not matter whether the essence of 
life is taken to mean all life or just human life here, what 
is significant is that the artist reflects this essence which 
is essentially chaotic. 
The difference between artistic illusion and the illusion 
of 'truth' (morality, science etc.) is made even more clear 
in another note from The Will to Power. The deception that 
is motivated by a desire for "rigidity, eternity, [and] being" 
is distinguished from deception that comes from "the desire 
for destruction, for change, for becoming" (WP 446). The 
latter is the desire for artistic creation and the former is 
the desire for concepts like absolute morality and logical 
systems. Here, Nietzsche makes it clear that the motivation 
for an artistic kind of deception is really what sets it apart 
from other forms of deception or lying. In The Genealogy of 
Morals Nietzsche verifies the importance of the artist I s 
motivation. 
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In Art the lie becomes consecrated, the will to 
deception has good conscience at its back. (GM 290) 
The ',good conscience' is the playful aspect of artistic 
creativity which lacks a designated direction or end. 
Art is motivated by this desire for creation, similarly, the 
will to power is concerned with creation. Artistic activity 
is "worth more than truth" (WP 453) because it operates in the 
same way as the will to power, while 'truth' (stability) 
stands in opposition to the nature of the will to power. The 
inartistic is described by Nietzsche as unconducive to life 
or the will to power. 
Inartistic states: among those who become impoverished, 
withdraw, grow pale, under whose eyes life suffers:-the 
Christian. (WP 430) 
Here, anyone who embraces the stability of morality and 
religion, is seen as negating life and its creative essence. 
Art and the Artist, on the other hand, affirm life. 
Art and nothing but art! ... the great seduction to life, 
the great stimulant of life. (WP 452) 
So, both art and stabilizing concepts such as 'truth' and 
morality are deceptions that are necessary for life. The 
illusion of morality, religion, etc. is antithetical to the 
essence of life while artistic illusion reflects life and its 
chaotic nature. 
This description of the artistic process has been 
developed from an examination of Nietzsche's later writings, 
specifically The Will to Power and The Genealogy of Morals. 
The additional information that has been gained about the will 
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to power in this chapter will be applied to the previous 
interpretations, and, in the final chapter the most coherent 
picture of the will to power will be illustrated. 
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****CHAPTER 5**** 
EVALUATION OF THE TWO INTERPRETATIONS 
Before drawing any conclusions about the nature of the 
will to power it is useful, at this point, to review what has 
already been covered. In chapter one, the basic conflict that 
is related to the will to power was illustrated by showing the 
opposing statements that Nietzsche makes about the possibility 
of metaphysical theory. Statements that support a 
metaphysical interpretation 
contrasted with statements 
of the will to 
that attack all 
power were 
metaphysical 
thinking. It was shown how Kaufmann and Heidegger fall on 
different sides of this conflict. Also, the major questions 
that each interpretation has to deal with were outlined. It 
was shown how Kaufmann's 'psychological' explanation has to 
explain away the apparently pro-metaphysical descriptions of 
the will to power. Kaufmann's theory also has to demonstrate 
that Nietzsche's denial of truth is a denial of metaphysical 
truth only, leaving the possibility for empirical truth. 
Heidegger's interpretation was shown as having to explain how 
the anti-metaphysical statements and a denial of all truth 
could exist along side of a metaphysical interpretation of the 
will to power. 
In chapters two and three, Kaufmann and Heidegger's 
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interpretations of the will to power were described in detail. 
Each dealt with explaining the resolutions to the problems 
posed in the first chapter. Each interpretation also touched 
upon the issues of: appropriate style of interpretation, 
whether or not Nietzsche's philosophy underwent an evolution, 
whether Nietzsche engaged in reflection or observation in 
formulating his theory 'the will to power', the validity of 
certain texts, and the proper reading of a passage from Beyond 
Good and Evil. A decision as to which interpretation presents 
the best explanation of each of these points will made in this 
chapter, but first, chapter four must be discussed. 
Chapter four examined Nietzsche's views on art and 
artistic creation. The connection between the artist and the 
will to power was stressed. What was also emphasized was how 
both the artist and life are involved in deception. The 
artist was depicted as deceiving without purpose or for the 
sake of deception, while life was shown to deceive out of the 
desire (or need) for stability. The result of the artist's 
deception was shown to be art, while life's deception was 
depicted as resulting in dogmatic institutions like religion, 
morality and logic. This description of art was given in 
order to gain further perspective on which interpretation, 
Kaufmann or Heidegger's, comes closer to being a true 
representation of Nietzsche's philosophy. This chapter plays 
such an important role in making a decision about Nietzsche 
that a decision about the validity of The Will to Power must 
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be made. The Will to Power was used as a major source of 
information for chapter four. 
This chapter (chapter 5), as well as the chapter on art, 
view The Will to Power as a viable source of Nietzsche's 
thought. This opposes Kaufmann, who views the text as 
unimportant because it was not organized by Nietzsche himself. 
Kaufmann sees the Will to Power as a collection of unrelated 
"Jottings and scribbles" that do not form a coherent system 
(Kaufmann 6) . While it is true that Nietzsche did not 
organize the notes that are contained in the text, this does 
not mean that the ideas expressed in this work are to be 
ignored. Heidegger also believes in the importance of The 
Will to Power and he provides his readers with ample evidence 
that Nietzsche spent years planning this text in order to 
present his mature philosophy. This evidence comes from a 
series of letters that were written by Nietzsche between 1884 
and 1887. On April 7, 1884, Nietzsche writes to his friend 
Overbeck: 
..• I am resolved to devote the next five years to the 
construction of my "philosophy", for which I have in my 
Zarathustra constructed a vestibule. (qtd. in Heidegger, 
1979, V.1 12) 
Here, Nietzsche is expressing his plans to 'construct' a major 
work which is to reflect his "philosophy". This does not 
appear to be the plan for some small experiment in thought 
considering that the lengthy Zarathustra is merely a 
'vestibule 1 • Instead it seems that this planed work is 
intended to sum up a great many of Nietzsche's ideas. 
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Nietzsche affirms this in another letter from 1884. This one 
is to his sister . 
... During the next few months I want to draw up the 
schema for my philosophy and my plan for the next six 
years. May my health hold out for this purpose! (qtd, 
in Heidegger, 1979, V.1 13) 
Here again Nietzsche expresses his plans for a major work 
which apparently will take years to construct and will reflect 
the nature of his entire philosophy. In 1886, in a letter to 
his mother and sister, Nietzsche calls this planned major work 
by name. 
For the next four years the creation of a four-volume 
magnum opus is proposed. The very title is fearsome: 
"The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All 
Values." (qtd. in Heidegger, 1979, V.1, 14) 
It is clear that the letters from this time period provide 
evidence of Nietzsche's intention to make The Will to Power 
a summation of his philosophy. Also, these letters indicate 
that the proposed date of completion for this work was to be 
around the year 1890. Nietzsche was unable to write after 
1888 so the work was never completed. There are however, 
several hundred notes left behind that Nietzsche had intended 
to use in The Will to Power. While there is speculation that 
Nietzsche's sister, who was a fanatical Nazi sympathizer, 
tampered with some of the notes contained in this text, there 
is no reason that all of these notes should be ignored. They 
are a valuable source (used along with the published material) 
for uncovering Nietzsche's mature philosophy, particularly, 
his views about the will to power and art. It is important 
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to note that no one should rely solely on this text for 
information about Nietzsche; his published works must also be 
used as support for the ideas found in The Will to Power. 
Now that a final decision has been made about the 
validity of the Will to Power, it is appropriate to attend to 
some of the other discrepancies that exist between Kaufmann 
and Heidegger's interpretations. 
Kaufmann viewed the will to power as a concept that 
underwent an evolution, while Heidegger saw it as a constant 
focus of Nietzsche's overall philosophy. Because he saw 
Nietzsche as a metaphysician, Heidegger could not allow for 
a view which depicted Nietzsche as a philosopher who 
'experimented' with the concept of 'will' and the will to 
power. The ideas of 'will' and being, for Heidegger, had to 
be at the center of Nietzsche's reflection throughout his 
entire philosophy. However, a correct interpretation of 
Nietzsche bears out the fact that the will to power did 
undergo a kind of evolution. Kaufmann demonstrates this 
development of the concept. The texts which Kaufmann cites 
provide convincing evidence that the will to power started off 
as a psychological theory and grew from there. In the mid to 
late 1870's Nietzsche's writings show that it was originally 
associated with only a few negative human characteristics 
(Kaufmann 179). In Human All too Human and Daybreak the 
concept of the will to power does in fact snowball into a 
larger and more encompassing psychological theory. Finally, 
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in Thus Spoke Zarathustra the concept expands even farther, 
becoming a psychological monism. This occurs in the chapter 
entitled "On the Thousand and One Goals". Kaufmann believes 
that this is as far as the concept can go. He denies that 
Nietzsche can ever consistently assert that the will to power 
explains anything more than human motivation. Appropriately, 
this is as far as Kaufmann's interpretation can go. 
While it is true that the will to power developed as a 
psychological theory, it is also true that it developed into 
a metaphysical theory. The seriousness with which Nietzsche 
declares that "this world is the will to power" (WP 550) can 
not be ignored. Support for this metaphysical view will be 
given later, but what is important to recognize here is that 
the will to power did undergo the development that Kaufmann 
outlines. This evolution or development of ideas is admitted 
by Nietzsche himself when he writes his own preface for The 
Birth of Tragedy. In this preface he discounts a lot of what 
is contained in the text, stating that he has matured 
intellectually since that time. Even though this example of 
The Birth of Tragedy relates to Nietzsche's ideas about art, 
it shows that his ideas from the early stages of his writings 
are subject to change. 
ideas. 
The will to power is one of these 
The view that Nietzsche's conception of the will to power 
undergoes an evolution effects another disputed matter. 
Kaufmann and Heidegger disagree as to whether the will to 
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power was reached as a result of reflection or as a result of 
observation and experimentation. It was previously decided 
that the will to power was originally conceived of as an 
explanation for certain types of behavior. This implies that 
Nietzsche observed various behaviors and then labeled them 
as resulting from the will to power. The concept was born out 
of these observations of human nature. So, if Kaufmann's 
interpretation is correct in asserting that the will to power 
evolved as a theory (which it is), then it follows that it was 
first formulated as a result of observation. Furthermore, the 
way that the theory developed was by Nietzsche experimenting 
with how far he could push this concept. The will to power 
expanded because of Nietzsche's investigations into how much 
it could explain. It was previously shown that Kaufmann's 
interpretation of the evolution of the will to power is 
correct up until his denial of the metaphysical status that 
it gains in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Similarly, the view that 
the character of the will to power is effected by observation 
is only correct up to a point. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Nietzsche ends the experimentation with the will to power and 
enters into reflection on how it relates to the world and the 
history of philosophy. This can be seen as a turning point 
in Nietzsche's philosophy where the scientist slips away and 
the metaphysician takes over. In his later writings the a 
priori assumptions that he makes become more frequent, not 
because of a loss of sanity, but because of his increasing 
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commitment to reflection and metaphysical thought. 
A kind of happy compromise between Kaufmann and 
Heidegger's interpretations can be seen here. Kaufmann' s 
interpretation of Nietzsche is correct up to the point where 
Nietzsche realizes that the will to power is more than an 
explanation for human motivation. This realization happens 
around the time of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. At this point 
Nietzsche is ready to view the will to power as the essence 
of all life, and all being as well. This is also the point 
where Kaufmann states that Nietzsche has completed all 
worthwhile insight into the concept of the will to power. 
(Kaufmann 207). He disregards much of Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
as being 'too poetic' to take seriously (Kaufmann 206). In 
his opinion the will to power is only viable as a 
psychological theory. Kaufmann's interpretation is mistaken 
about the completion of Nietzsche's valuable insight into the 
concept of the will to power onwards from this time period. 
He is also mistaken about the importance of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. He is, however, correct about the development 
of Nietzsche's thought up to this point. In contrast, 
Heidegger's interpretation of the will to power can be seen 
as being accurate from Thus Spoke Zarathustra on. Heidegger 
states that the work is the most important of the published 
writings. In fact, he sees it as 'the vestibule' for what he 
considers the most important unpublished work, The Will to 
Power. This implies that Heidegger sees Nietzsche's most 
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worthwhile thought as beginning with Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche as a metaphysician 
engaging in reflection does, in fact, accurately describe the 
character of Nietzsche's later writings. So, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra can be seen as a turning point for Nietzsche as 
well as the point where Kaufmann' s interpretation becomes 
invalid with regard to viewing Nietzsche as an experimenter. 
Heidegger's view becomes relevant at this same point because 
it accurately describes the metaphysical character of 
Nietzsche's later thought. 
Now it is appropriate to look at the conflicting 
interpretations of Passage #36 from Beyond Good and Evil. 
Since the work was written after Thus Spoke Zarathustra a 
metaphysical interpretation of the passage seems inevitable. 
Heidegger's interpretation does in fact fit this passage 
better than Kaufmann's. The section where the 'instinctual 
life' is depicted as being the ramification of the will to 
power does imply that all life, not just human life, is 
governed by the will to power. This was demonstrated in the 
Chapter on Heidegger (p. 58) . The first section of the 
passage, where Nietzsche assumes that our 'drives' are all we 
can know for certain, also supports a Heideggerian view. The 
most important thing about this section is that it is, as 
Clark points out, formulated from a priori assumptions. The 
a priori thought that characterizes most of Nietzsche's later 
writings can be clearly seen here. This a priori 
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interpretation of the first section supports Heidegger's view 
and is presented in the chapter on Heidegger (p.59). Finally 
the last sentence of the passage strongly asserts that the 
'the world' can be defined as 'the will to power'. It is 
clear that 'the world 1 , in this case, refers to more than just 
the world of the mind. 
Along with supporting Heidegger I s interpretation, passage 
#36 shows the transition between Nietzsche as experimenter and 
Nietzsche as metaphysician. This is the first work published 
after Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the switch in thinking is 
apparently still fresh in Nietzsche's mind. A major thrust 
of the passage is the description of taking what is known 
through observation, that which is 'given', and then 
reflecting on the nature of 'the world'. This can be seen as 
Nietzsche taking the psychological conception of the will to 
power (described by Kaufmann) and applying it to much more 
than human motivation. This psychological idea of the will 
to power is now expanded through reflection and not 
observation. Since it is established that this passage 
contains a new view of the will to power that is formed 
through a priori thinking, it is clear that it also indicates 
the switch from observation to reflection. 
Continuing with this assessment of the disputed aspects 
of Nietzsche's philosophy, truth must be looked at. It was 
shown in the chapter on art that Heidegger's view of 
Nietzsche's theory of truth is the correct one. The chapter 
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followed a close read of The Will to Power (along with other 
texts) in order to determine that truth, like art, is 
essentially a deception . Life creates certain truths 
(religion, 
stability. 
morality, logic, etc.) in order to create 
This stability that is 'truth' is not, however, 
true. Nietzsche saw 'truth' as something that is created in 
order to survive. He also saw truth as a correspondence to 
what is properly real. The 'truth' that is put forth in order 
to create stability is not true, or is a deception, because 
it does not correspond to the chaotic nature of the world. 
Nietzsche believes that nothing can be true in this sense of 
corresponding to reality because reality is constantly in 
flux. The closest we come to understanding this reality is 
through artistic creation which acts in the same chaotic 
manner. It is appropriate to ask, at this point, how 
Nietzsche can say that he knows reality is in flux if there 
is no possibility for truth about reality? How can he posit 
the will to power as this reality if the will to power is 
essentially unknowable? How can the will to power answer all 
of the psychological and metaphysical questions that Nietzsche 
says it does if there is no possibility for any real knowledge 
and we have 'no organ for truth' (GS 300). Heidegger is right 
in interpreting Nietzsche as noticing these contradictions and 
letting them exist. Nietzsche admits his dual role as 
metaphysician and annihilator of metaphysics in the chapter 
"On Self Over-Coming" from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
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That I must be a struggle and a becoming and an end and 
an opposition to ends-alas, whoever guesses what is my 
will should also guess on what crooked paths it must 
proceed. 
Whatever I create and however much I love it- soon 
I must oppose it and my love; (Z 227) 
Here, Nietzsche admits that his denial of truth is 
inconsistent with the presentation of ideas that he believes 
to be true. 
It has already been established that Heidegger's 
interpretation of the will to power is the one that is favored 
in this paper. While he seems to be incorrect in denying that 
the will to power undergoes an evolution, his interpretation 
of the will to power as the essence of all being fits the 
final understanding that Nietzsche has of the concept. The 
way that the will to power develops before Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra provides valuable psychological insight. But, it 
is the conception of the will to power as the essential 
character of all being which carries the most weight in 
determining Nietzsche's ultimate role in the history of 
philosophy. Nietzsche's role is as a metaphysician who sought 
to attack metaphysics from within. His metaphysical theories 
stand next to his resentment of metaphysics. Even his own 
metaphysical theories, Heidegger rightly points out, serve to 
undermine metaphysics due to their radical nature. Nietzsche 
was much like his own concept of the will to power in that he 
was perpetually at war with himself, creating metaphysical 
theory while at the same destroying metaphysics. 
The metaphysical interpretation that Heidegger presents 
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is obtained from using The Will to Power as a valid source for 
discovering Nietzsche's ultimate philosophy. It was mentioned 
that this paper also views that text as useful. It is from 
an examination of The Will to Power, as well as some of the 
other later writings, that a conclusion about the validity of 
Heidegger's interpretation has been made. The will to power 
is clearly presented as a metaphysical idea in these texts. 
The chapter on art also helped to bring about a 
conclusion that is sympathetic to Heidegger's interpretation. 
In this chapter it was established that Nietzsche views 
artistic creation as a reflection of the will to power. 
Artistic creation was depicted as an activity which involves 
'creating in innocence' . The artistic process, for Nietzsche, 
is the creation of illusion for the sole purpose of illusion. 
There is no ulterior motive involved in true artistic 
creation. Similarly, there is no goal or designated end in 
the creative activity of the will to power. Chapter four 
depicted the will to power as the essence of life that is 
essentially in flux and chaotic. Chapter four also showed 
that the desire for illusion in the artistic process is unlike 
the desire for illusion that gives rise to 'truth'. In the 
case of 'truth' the deception or illusion that is sought is 
motivated by a desire for stability. Perhaps more importantly 
the desire for the illusion of stable 'truth' is motivated by 
an aversion to that which is not stable, namely, the will to 
power. 
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Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche recognizes that 
the will to power is chaotic and that it gives itself the 
appearance of stability in 'truths' like religion, science and 
morality. In the chapter on Heidegger's interpretation 
(chapte~ 3) it was explained that the reason the will to power 
gives itself the appearance of stability is that it has an 
'aversion' to its own chaotic nature. Heidegger discusses 
this aversion to chaos or 'transience' in "Who is Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra?". Heidegger correctly interprets Nietzsche's 
view of 'truth' as an attempt at stabilizing the transience 
of the will to power. Heidegger also is correct when he 
interprets Nietzsche as viewing artistic creation as the 
closest thing there is to 'real' truth (truth as 
correspondence to reality). Heidegger believes that Nietzsche 
saw artistic creation as exemplifying the chaotic nature of 
the will to power. Under Heidegger's view of Nietzsche, the 
artist has the greatest sensitivity to the will to power. If 
this is the case, then the artist also has the best perception 
of the essence of life because the will to power, under 
Heidegger's interpretation, represents the true essence of 
life. In other words, while 'truth' does not represent the 
chaotic nature of the essence of life, artistic creation does. 
Heidegger's interpretation is right in line with the view of 
art that has been presented in chapter four. His 
interpretation of Nietzsche describes the will to power as the 
Being of beings and depicts the artist as the one who lets 
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Being (the will to power) be. Heidegger is correct to 
interpret Nietzsche as viewing the artist as the one who 
exemplifies the will to power because he lets transience and 
chaos reign. The artist does not impose stability, instead 
he acts without goals or ends, like the will to power does. 
In comparison to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche 
which has a metaphysical view of the artist, Kaufmann' s 
interpretation pays little attention to the significance of 
artistic creation in Nietzsche's overall philosophy. Kaufmann 
focusses on the development of Nietzsche's theory of artistic 
creation and does not pursue the idea that the artist is the 
one who exemplifies the essence of the will to power. While 
Kaufmann' s explanation of the development of Nietzsche's 
artistic theory is accurate and useful, the metaphysical 
implications of Nietzsche's ultimate view of the artist are 
neglected in his interpretation. 
Finally, Heidegger's style of interpretation is far 
superior to Kaufmann's. It definitely would please Nietzsche 
if he knew that someone was interpreting his writings 
personally. Also, the passion that Heidegger's interpretation 
possesses is something that Nietzsche would approve of. 
Heidegger is right to see Nietzsche as demanding that those 
who read him become affected somehow. Nietzsche is calling 
for a new way of thinking and Heidegger apparently hears this 
call. The role that Nietzsche sees his reader playing is 
illustrated in the description of the child as the third 
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metamorphoses in "On The Three Metamorphoses". 
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, 
a game, a self propelled wheel, a first movement, a 
sacred "yes" ••.. The spirit now wills his own will, and 
he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own 
world. (Z 139) 
This is what Nietzsche hopes his efforts can accomplish. It 
is as if he is saying "I have done the work of the first two 
metamorphoses. Now it is your turn". The first two 
metamorphoses represent the gathering together and destroying 
of all previous valuations (religion, metaphysics,etc.). 
Heidegger's interpretation would correctly include the will 
to power and its radical nature as part of the second 
metamorphoses (the will to power being part of the end of an 
era). Nietzsche represents the end of a period in history. 
The task for the reader is to realize this and to assist in 
the establishment of a new approach to philosophical thought. 
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